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Abstract 
In 2005 a major reform of the German means-tested unemployment benefit sys-
tem came into force. The reform aimed at activating benefit recipients, e.g., by a 
workfare programme, the so-called One-Euro-Job. This programme was imple-
mented at a large scale. Participants receive their means-tested benefit and a 
small compensation of usually one to 1.5 € per hour worked. Participation typi-
cally lasts six months or less. We investigate the impact of One-Euro-Jobs for 
participants who entered the programme at the start of the year 2005. We apply 
propensity score matching to estimate the treatment effects on the outcomes 
regular employment, neither being registered as unemployed nor as job-seeker 
and no unemployment benefit II receipt. We observe these outcomes for about 
two years after programme start. The locking-in effects are small. Moreover, 20 
months after programme there is a significant but small positive impact on the 
employment rate of female but not male participants. During the first two years 
after programme start, participation does not contribute to avoiding unemploy-
ment benefit II receipt. Our results imply that there is some effect heterogeneity: 
Participation reduces the employment rate of participants younger than 25 years, 
but raises it for some older participant groups. It is ineffective for participants 
who were recently employed, while it is effective for participants who lost their 
last contributory job between 1992 and 2000.  
 
JEL classification: C13, H43, J68 
 
Keywords: Propensity score matching, evaluation of active labour market policy, 
workfare, means-tested benefit recipients 
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1 Introduction 
Due to high and persistent unemployment reforms of German labour market pol-
icy in the last years concentrated to a large extent on activation policies for un-
employed persons.1 One of the reforms was implemented with the introduction of 
the Social Code II. A new means-tested benefit, the unemployment benefit II (UB 
II), was introduced at the start of the year 2005. It replaced the two former 
means-tested benefits, unemployment assistance and social benefit, for employ-
able persons in needy households. The Social Code II in contrast to the former 
system emphasises activation policies. One of these policies is a workfare pro-
gramme, which was implemented at a large scale: The work opportunity pro-
gramme in which participants receive their unemployment benefit II and addi-
tionally one to two Euros per hour worked - the so called One-Euro-Job.2 In this 
paper we evaluate whether participation in the One-Euro-Job scheme improves 
the labour market performance of participants. 
One-Euro-Jobs are subordinate to regular employment, vocational training and 
other active labour market programmes. The jobs have to be of public interest 
and additional in the sense that they would not be carried out without the sub-
sidy. In so far they are similar to traditional job creation schemes. Yet, while in 
the latter type of programme participants receive a wage, participants in One-
Euro-Jobs receive their UB II and as already mentioned additionally a small com-
pensation for their working-time. The basic goal of One-Euro-Jobs is to activate 
those UB II recipients who have particular difficulties in finding a job. Neverthe-
less, UB II agencies can rely on the programme as a work-test. After the intro-
duction of the Social Code II the programme became the most important active 
labour market policy in Germany in terms of the number of persons entering the 
programme. More than 600,000 persons were registered as starting the pro-
gramme in the year 2005 and even more than 700,000 in the year 2006. Com-
pared to the stock of unemployed recipients of UB II of roughly two and a half 
million in those years the size of the inflow is very high. 
To our knowledge there is no study on the impact of participation in the One-
Euro-Job programme on the labour market performance of participants. Quanti-
fying such effects is particularly important from a policy point of view, since the 
programme attempts to improve the employability of people whose job-finding 
perspectives are among the worst. It is also of much interest from a more gen-
eral point of view, as we can determine how workfare influences different types 
of participants: Given the large scale of the programme, we can estimate treat-
                                                
1  A comprehensive description of recent institutional changes of German labour market 
policy can be found in Jacobi and Kluve (2007). These reforms are well known in Ger-
many as the Hartz reforms, as many of them were proposed by a commission that 
was led by Peter Hartz, head of the personnel executive committee of Volkswagen.   
2  Similar measures existed under the old social assistance regime: the Help Towards 
Work (Hilfe zur Arbeit) programme created work opportunities to integrate social as-
sistance recipients into work and in order to test their willingness to work.  Municipali-
ties organised the programme independently and without any central coordination, 
such that their implementation at the local level came in a wide variety of forms (Vo-
ges et al. 2001). An evaluation of the effectiveness of these programmes was not car-
ried out, due to the lack of micro data. For a description of the Help Towards Work 
programme see for example Voges et al. (2001). 
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ment effects on the treated separately for many different groups of participants 
who entered the programme over a very short period of time.  
In contrast to most evaluation studies that estimate programme effects with ad-
ministrative data, we can incorporate considerable information on the household 
of programme participants and control individuals. The introduction of the Social 
Code II also implemented a new data collection system which makes unemploy-
ment benefit II agencies collect information on all members of needy households. 
In turn any member of an unemployment benefit II recipient household can be 
tracked over time and the administrative data of partners or other household 
members on employment, unemployment, active labour market programme par-
ticipation, benefit receipt from other administrative data sources can be retrieved 
for our analysis. With this data set-up many research questions in the context of 
poor households can be addressed using the entire population of households with 
means-tested benefit receipt and not just small samples. 
Our study estimates the effect of programme participation using matching meth-
ods. The effects are estimated for the entire inflow into the One-Euro-Job pro-
gramme during the months February to April 2005. We only regard programme 
participants if they were unemployed on 31st January 2005 and received UB II at 
that time. The potential control group members stem from a 20 percent random 
sample of needy persons in the unemployment stock at the end of January 2005. 
Of course we excluded all people from the unemployment stock, who started a 
One-Euro-Job from February to April 2005. However, controls may enter this 
programme at later points in time. Hence, we estimate the effect of joining the 
programme in this time period.  
We are concerned with effects of programme participation on the regular em-
ployment rate, on whether the participants are neither registered as unemployed 
nor job-seeking and on the rate of no UB II receipt. The effects are generally es-
timated separately for men and women in East and in West Germany, given the 
different labour market situation of the two German regions. However, we also 
deal with effect heterogeneity according to age, nationality/migration status, oc-
cupational qualification, the regional unemployment rate, and time since last 
regular employment. This should first of all show for which groups the pro-
gramme is most effective in its current set-up. It should also give some insights 
on why and when the policy achieves or fails to achieve (some of) its goals: E.g., 
the programme may improve employability of the participants, though not suffi-
ciently to lead to an immediate success in terms of an increased employment 
rate. However, in a low unemployment region the improvement of employability 
is more likely to also affect the regular employment rate than in a region with 
high unemployment. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two describes the institutional set-up 
of the new unemployment benefit II and of the related One-Euro-Job pro-
gramme. In section three, we provide a short literature review on the effects of 
workfare programmes and public employment schemes. Section four discusses a 
theoretical background for our analysis together with some key hypotheses of our 
study. The methods and data are described in section five. We discuss the results 
of our analysis in section six and briefly summarize and conclude in the final sec-
tion seven.  
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2 Institutional framework and target groups of 
One-Euro-Jobs 
With the introduction of the Social Code II at the start of the year 2005 major 
reforms of the German unemployment compensation system came into force (the 
so called “Hartz IV”-reforms). A new means-tested benefit system was intro-
duced: The unemployment benefit II (UB II) replaced the former means-test un-
employment assistance (UA) and social assistance (SA) for needy employable 
people.3,4 The reform did not generally cut benefit levels for needy households.5 
The central idea behind introducing the Social Code II was to activate needy peo-
ple, so that more of them are integrated into the labour market and their benefit 
dependency should be reduced. This is of particular importance for people who 
without the reform would have received SA benefit as well as for people who 
would have been partners or other household members of a UA benefit recipient. 
Without the reform such people would not necessarily have been in contact with 
labour agencies, registered as unemployed or as job-seekers nor would they 
have qualified for many types of active labour market policies. Due to the reform 
this has changed and each employable member of a needy household is sup-
posed to contribute to reducing the dependency on the means-tested benefit.  
On the one hand, the Social Code II demands efforts of unemployed persons with 
regard to job search and other activities to improve their chances of finding a 
job. Integration contracts and benefit sanctions for those who do not comply to 
the rules are instruments to raise such efforts. On the other hand, the reform 
provides more possibilities of assisting unemployed persons towards employment 
take-up and in particular led to more intensive active labour market policies. 
One option of promoting and challenging unemployed persons is public employ-
ment such as work opportunities that have their legal basis in the Social Code II. 
Two types of work opportunities exist: (a) Work opportunities with wage (“Ar-
beitsgelegenheiten in der Entgeltvariante”) and (b) work opportunities with an 
                                                
3  The old unemployment insurance (UI) benefit was labelled as unemployment benefit I. 
It is earnings-related with a replacement rate of 67 percent for a parent and 60 per-
cent for childless people.  The UI benefit in contrast to UB II is time-limited, where the 
length of receipt increases with the time a recipient has contributed to unemployment 
insurance within a period of seven years prior to the benefit claim. The maximum du-
ration of UI receipt though depends on age and was one year for those aged younger 
than 45 in the year 2005. It increased for older age groups and those older than 56 
years could even receive their UI benefit up to 32 months. The maximum durations of 
those older than 44 years though were considerably reduced in the year 2006. 
4 People who are aged between 15 and 64 and can work under the usual conditions of 
the labour market for at least three hours a day are regarded as employable. Only due 
to an illness or disability, it is possible not to fulfil this criterion (Article 8 Social Code 
II). 
5  Blos and Rudolph (2005) showed in a simulation study based on micro data from an 
income and consumption survey how the benefit levels of former social benefit recipi-
ents and former unemployment assistance recipients were affected by the benefit re-
form. It did not much affect benefit levels of households of former social benefit re-
cipients. However, about 17 percent of former unemployment assistance recipients no 
longer qualified for the new means-tested benefit. Of those former unemployment as-
sistance households, which qualified for UB II, about 50 percent faced benefit reduc-
tions and 50 percent a benefit increase.  
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allowance to unemployment benefit II for additional expenses (“Arbeitsgelegen-
heiten in der Mehraufwandsvariante” or “One-Euro-Jobs”). More than 95% of the 
programme starts of work opportunities are One-Euro-Jobs, so that we regard 
this latter programme.  
There are various goals of the One-Euro-Job programme (Federal Employment 
Agency 2005). They should raise the employability of long-term unemployed per-
sons and enhance their chances of finding regular employment. Furthermore, 
they aim at the social integration of needy unemployed persons by providing 
them with a task and a daily routine. Moreover, they can be seen as a contribu-
tion to the provision of public goods by the needy people who have to work for 
their UB II receipt. Finally, One-Euro-Jobs are also a means of testing an unem-
ployed person’s willingness to work.  
The tasks carried out in One-Euro-Jobs have to be of public utility and additional 
in the sense that they would not be completed without the subsidy. In the year 
2005 most One-Euro-Job participations lasted up to six months (Hohmeyer et al. 
2006). Additional expenses in One-Euro-Jobs average 1.25 € per hour worked 
(Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006). Regarding the average working time of One-Euro-Jobs 
of nearly 30 hours per week this adds up to about 145 € per month additional to 
UB II. UB II consists of a base benefit currently at 347 € per month for a single 
person6 costs of accommodation and heating and an additional benefit for those 
who received within the last two years unemployment insurance (UI) benefit.7 
One-Euro-Jobs are designed for employable needy persons aged between 15 and 
64 years. They are subordinate to regular employment, vocational training and 
other active labour market programmes. Thus, they are a measure of last resort 
and persons with specific difficulties to find employment should be more likely to 
participate in One-Euro-Jobs than those with better chances of finding a job. This 
at least partly conflicts with the idea that the programme should serve as a work-
test. Such a work-test is more likely to be effective for people with good job find-
ing perspectives. Hence, it is not surprising that recent research describing the 
structure of participants (inflow) shows that One-Euro-Jobs are not targeted on 
specific groups of unemployed people, who are hard to place (Heinemann et al. 
2006, Hohmeyer et al. 2006, Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006). This may either be due to 
cream skimming or to the use of One-Euro-Jobs as a work test.  
                                                
6  When the new system was introduced in the year 2005 this base benefit of ‘unem-
ployment benefit II’ was lower 345 Euro for a lone adult or lone parent in West Ger-
many and Berlin and 331 Euro in the five federal states in East Germany. It was 
raised to the Western level for UB II recipients in the East German federal states in 
July 2006. 
7  The additional benefit is related to the difference between the sum of the former UI 
and housing benefit receipt and the UB II benefit level. It amounts to two thirds of this 
difference in the first year after running out of UI receipt. However, there is an upper 
cap for the additional benefit of 160 €  for singles and 320 € for partners. For each 
child that lives in the needy household of a person who is eligible for the additional 
benefit, the upper cap is raised by 60 €. In the second year after exhausting UI bene-
fit receipt the additional benefit is cut by 50 percent. 
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3 Literature Review 
As work opportunities have just been introduced in January 2005, no evaluation 
results are available for this specific programme in Germany. Nevertheless, it is 
worth discussing the lessons learned from the evaluation literature on similar 
programmes both in Germany and in other countries. Of course such evaluation 
results cannot be just transferred to our context as they have emerged for pro-
grammes that differed from work opportunities in several aspects, have taken 
place in a different context and for different groups of participants. 
The German work opportunity programme resembles first, public employment 
programmes for unemployment benefit recipients and second, workfare pro-
grammes for social benefit recipients. One-Euro-Jobs are similar to both of them, 
as the two types of programmes are supposed to create jobs of public interest 
that do not compete with existing private sector jobs. But while public employ-
ment programmes mainly aim at integrating participants into the labour market, 
workfare programmes also imply that participants reciprocate for the benefit re-
ceipt. In turn for the benefit receipt which is financed by the society participants 
contribute to the provision of public goods. 
Evidence on Germany 
a) public employment programmes 
Job creation schemes have already been introduced in Germany in 1969 with the 
job promotion law (“Arbeitsförderungsgesetz”). In 2000 job creation schemes 
were one of the most widely-used active labour market programmes. Just like 
One-Euro-Jobs job creation schemes have to be of public use and additional. In 
contrast to participants of One-Euro-Jobs persons working in a job creation 
scheme receive a wage. And of course the group of participants is different: Till 
the end of 2004 only those persons who received UI or UA benefit were eligible to 
participate in job creation schemes.  
Recently, the effectiveness of the scheme for the participants has been studied 
intensively. Applying a statistical matching approach Caliendo, Hujer and 
Thomsen investigated in several non-experimental studies the impact of German 
job creation schemes on the labour market performance of participants who 
started their job creation scheme at the beginning of the year 2000 (Caliendo 
2006; Caliendo et al. 2005a, b).8 Positive effects of public employment pro-
grammes on the regular employment rate of participants can only be found for a 
few specific groups and only nearly three years after programme start (Caliendo 
et al. 2005a, b). For participants taken together and in the short run public em-
ployment programmes have a negative or zero impact on employment chances. 
Participation raises the employment rate of long-term unemployed people, highly 
qualified men with above average labour market prospects and West German 
women, in particularly those who are older than 50 years or long-term unem-
ployed (Caliendo 2006). This beneficial effect though only emerges at about 
nearly three years after programme start. Participation is associated with high 
locking-in effects given that it lasts about one year. 
                                                
8  The authors estimated the treatment effects on the treated with matching estimators. 
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b) “Help Towards Work“ (Hilfe zur Arbeit) for recipients of social benefits 
Despite the high number of participants in the German „Help Towards Work“ pro-
gramme no evaluation studies on its labour market impacts exist. The reason for 
this is that the programme was placed to the local authorities’ responsibility and 
therefore large regional differences existed. Some regional studies in the form of 
integration rates and cost benefit analyses exist (e.g., Böckmann-Schewe/Röhrig 
1997; Kempken/Trube 1997; Trube 1994). But without comparing integration 
rates of participants to those of a suitable comparison group, the studies are not 
regarding the effectiveness of the programme. 
International Evidence 
The international studies can also be divided into the two fields of employment 
programmes for unemployment insurance benefit recipients who are rather close 
to the labour market and workfare programmes for social welfare recipients. 
a) public employment programmes 
Gerfin and Lechner (2001) investigate the impacts of various active labour mar-
ket schemes in Switzerland on the employment probability of participants. These 
employment programmes (partly) have to create jobs that are additional like 
One-Euro-Jobs. The results of the study suggest that participation decreases the 
employment probability during the first 15 months after programme start. Only 
for women who start a programme in the public sector their employment rate 
after participation is higher than after non-participation. Moreover, the authors 
find positive impacts on the employment rate of participants for wage subsidies 
for jobs that are not required to be additional. Thus, they conclude that an im-
portant factor for the success of a programme is that the subsidised jobs are 
similar to regular jobs. 
Calmfors et al. (2002) come to the same conclusion as Gerfin and Lechner 
(2001) in their overview of Swedish evaluation studies regarding different out-
come variables: the effect of an employment programme increases if the job is 
closer to the labour market. Programmes like “relief work” and “work experience” 
are similar to One-Euro-Jobs in the respect that they are not similar to jobs in the 
regular labour market. They have either negative or zero effects on the labour 
market performance of participants. 
b) workfare programmes 
By “Workfare” we understand public employment programmes for recipients of 
social benefits. Following Lodemel (2000, 2005) workfare programmes show 
three constituting elements: 
• Participation is compulsory. Benefits can be cut if needy persons refuse to 
participate. This means unemployment is also regarded as a lack of motiva-
tion. 
• The programme is primarily about work. Qualification can be but is not neces-
sarily content of the programme. 
• Workfare is targeted on social benefit recipients. Benefit recipients are sup-
posed to work for or instead of receiving benefits. 
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Following this definition One-Euro-Jobs are a workfare programme. Therefore, 
some lessons can be learned from the evaluation literature on workfare pro-
grammes in other countries. 
Gueron and Pauly (1991) find positive effects of temporary workfare-
programmes in the United States: future income of participants increases com-
pared to non-participants. Lissenburgh (2001) identifies for Great Britain that the 
New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed has a positive impact on labour market 
chances of participants. However, the considered programmes are mainly wage 
subsidies. Thus, comparability with One-Euro-Jobs is restricted. 
Also in Denmark positive impacts of workfare programmes on labour market per-
formance of participants can be found: Bolvig et al. (2003) find that workfare 
reduces the duration of benefit receipt mainly for persons with various placement 
barriers und persons under the age of 25. Locking-in effects are stronger for 
women than for men. Though participation in the considered programmes im-
proves the chances of leaving welfare receipt, the duration of the subsequent 
employment cannot be increased. 
Ochel (2004) resumes evaluation studies from various countries and concludes 
that subsidised employment is more effective than employment in programmes 
that are very distant to the labour market. Locking-in effects occur for employ-
ment programmes in the public sector. 
To sum up, public employment schemes seem to be effective only for specific 
groups of participants. However, the results of the discussed evaluation studies 
do not allow us to draw already conclusions on the impact of participation in One-
Euro-Jobs. 
On the one hand a positive impact of One-Euro-Jobs on the labour market per-
formance of participants can be expected, if we consider that job creation 
schemes enhanced labour market prospects for long-term unemployed partici-
pants, a group who can be regarded as similar to unemployment benefit II re-
cipients (Caliendo 2006). On the other hand an adverse impact may be expected 
since One-Euro-Jobs have to be additional and of public interest (see results from 
Gerfin/Lechner 2001; Ochel 2004). Therefore the impacts of One-Euro-Jobs be-
sides a short-term labour market relief are not known ex-ante. Considering the 
quantitative importance of One-Euro-Jobs and the persistent high rates of unem-
ployment more knowledge about the impact of One-Euro-Jobs on individual em-
ployment chances is desirable. 
4 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) affect the labour market through a number 
of channels: e.g. by changing the matching efficiency between labour demand 
and labour supply, altering labour demand and supply at a given wage rate or by 
altering the wage-setting process (Calmfors 1994). In this paper we are con-
cerned with the micro-effects of One-Euro-Jobs on participants. The participation 
in ALMP may influence the participants' labour market performance in various 
ways.  
ALMPs may raise the effectiveness of job search of participants: Calmfors (1994) 
as well as Hagen and Steiner (2000) mention some reasons for this: First of all, 
qualifications of the job searchers adjust to requirements of job vacancies. Ad-
justment becomes necessary as according to human capital theory unemploy-
ment leads to loss of human capital and due to structural shifts in qualification 
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requirements. In this context One-Euro-Jobs could be beneficial, since partici-
pants may be trained on the job. Moreover, by participating in the programme 
long-term non-employed people could compensate for a loss of very basic skills, 
e.g., if they are no longer used to regular work-schedules. This might increase 
the participants' probability of getting a job offer. Second, ALMP participation 
could also achieve a rise in the arrival rate of job offers, because it signals em-
ployers the participant's the willingness to work. Finally, ALMPs could raise the 
search effort of participants: One-Euro-Jobs may reduce the value of benefit re-
ceipt due to a loss of leisure and because of making it harder to achieve earnings 
in the shadow economy.  
Besides these desired effects, adverse effects can occur. First, locking-in effects 
can arise, that reduce efforts made by unemployed persons to search for em-
ployment. While participating in One-Euro-Jobs, a person's search efforts de-
crease, e.g., because participation reduces the time available for job search. Fur-
thermore participation can reduce the motivation to look for employment be-
cause participants derive some utility from programme participation, e.g., due to 
carrying out a useful task instead of being without employment. Job search ef-
forts can already decline before participation started if the unemployed person 
knows about his participation in advance (“Ashenfelter’s Dip”). 
Even if the One-Euro-Job participation increases search efforts of the participants 
and they more quickly find regular employment than others, there still could be 
some adverse effects. Assume that the programme works partly through making 
benefit receipt more inconvenient for the participants. Moreover, assume that 
participants are aware of the fact that without participating in the programme, 
they would have faced benefit sanctions. Then the treatment could lead to faster 
job finding through lower reservation wages, such that participants tend to ac-
cept lower paid jobs than non-participants. In that case even if the regular em-
ployment rate of participants is raised, the likelihood that the households of the 
treated individuals are no longer needy may be adversely affected.  
Moreover employers possibly do not regard active labour market programmes as 
equivalent to regular employment or other forms of qualification (stigma effect). 
This is likely to be the case if a programme like work opportunities is supposed to 
target people with specific difficulties to find a job such as long-term unemployed 
people. Therefore, stigma effects could play an important role. Moreover, One-
Euro-Jobs should be additional to regular employment, such that the work ex-
perience in such jobs possibly is of little value for private employers. Hence, if 
there is no stigma effect, still for this reason participation may not contribute to 
raise the labour market performance of the participants. 
Thus, the actual effect of active labour market programmes on the labour market 
performance of participants in general and of the One-Euro-Job in particular is 
not a priori clear. It has to be quantified by econometric research. For a number 
of reasons there should be groups of unemployed people for which this particular 
programme is likely to be effective or ineffective. Let us discuss some specific 
hypotheses, which our analysis is going to address.  
Assume One-Euro-Job participation indeed does contribute to people’s acquire-
ment of basic skills needed to take up regular jobs. Then the programme clearly 
should help people with little experience in the labour market or people who were 
not regularly employed for long periods of time. The reason is that for them the 
beneficial effects of the programme are more likely to dominate the adverse ef-
fects like the locking-in effect than for others.  
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The programme is supposed to improve the employability of people. Thus it may 
not be sufficient to raise their job-finding probabilities in the short-term. How-
ever, the higher the labour demand is, the more rapidly should an improvement 
in employability lead to a rise in the job finding rate of participants. So in low un-
employment regions we should find the programme to be more effective than in 
high unemployment ones.  
Creaming may be one of the reasons why beneficial effects of programme par-
ticipation could be weak or absent and adverse locking-in and stigma effects 
dominate. This may be the case for groups of people with relatively good chances 
of finding a job, e.g., people with high qualifications, who are young or who only 
recently lost their jobs.  
For young unemployed people as a group there is another reason why the policy 
in its current implementation could be ineffective. UB II recipients who are 
younger than 25 years are a special target group according to the Social Code II 
and are supposed to be placed to work, training or work opportunities immedi-
ately (Article 3 paragraph 2, Social Code II). In addition, the government defined 
an intermediate goal for this target group: young unemployed people should be 
registered as unemployed for no longer than three months (Federal Employment 
Agency 2006). This goal can be achieved by making them participate in pro-
grammes like One-Euro-Jobs. As a consequence the One-Euro-Job programme is 
far more concentrated on young than on other needy unemployed people. But 
this may come at a cost: UB II agencies probably select frequently young unem-
ployment benefit II recipients into the programme, who would find more easily a 
job without this type of treatment. Therefore, an adverse participation effect for 
this target group is possible. Nevertheless, the programme may still have a bene-
ficial effect as a work-test for young UB II recipients but rather due to a threat 
effect of strong benefit sanctions, if they refuse to participate. 
This brings us to implications of the role of a programme as a work-test. Suppose 
that some needy unemployed people regard the programme as a threat, given 
that they have an earnings potential that is considerably higher than their unem-
ployment benefit II or they have relatively high chances of finding a job. For 
them programme participation is hence similar to a benefit sanction. Such per-
sons in contrast to those with low earnings potential will search harder for a job 
to avoid entering the programme (an ex-ante effect of the programme). Locking-
in effects for participants with relatively good chances of finding well-paid jobs 
should be high anyway. The work-test element may even strengthen this effect. 
If programme participation is similar to a sanction for such groups of participants, 
there should also be an ex-post effect. Due to high opportunity costs of participa-
tion, their search efforts could become higher and reservation wages lower than 
ex-ante. Then in particular after participation is completed their employment 
rates at some point in time may exceed those of comparable non-participants 
and locking-in effects could disappear quickly after participation. However, if the 
work-test mainly leads to ex-ante effects this will not be the case and for partici-
pants with high qualification, of young age or with recent job loss, the impact of 
participation on their employment rate may be low or even negative. Our study 
will not identify ex-ante effects: But for the interpretation of the results, these 
issues are still of importance.   
Finally, the effects of the programme on the regular employment rate may differ 
from those on the rate of “no UB II receipt”. Given that non-participants have 
more time to search for a job, they may be choosier with respect to wage offers. 
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In turn earnings that (comparable) control persons achieve in a new job could be 
higher and more frequently high enough to terminate benefit receipt than for 
treatments. But then the impact of One-Euro-Job participation on “no UB II re-
ceipt” should be lower than its impact on the employment rate at least in the 
short-term. Moreover, if the impact on the employment rate is not far from zero, 
the effect on the rate of “no UB II receipt” is likely to be negative. 
5 Methods and Data 
5.1 Methods 
When evaluating the programme effects of One-Euro-Jobs, the problem of unob-
servable possible outcomes arises. This is the fundamental evaluation problem. 
The Roy (1951)-Rubin (1974)-Model gives a standard framework of this problem. 
The model and the matching method which under certain assumptions resolves 
the evaluation problem are discussed in many recent papers, e.g. 
Caliendo/Kopeinig (2006) or Sianesi (2004). The main pillars in the model are 
first individuals, second the treatment and third potential outcomes. 
Every individual can potentially be in two states (treatment/no treatment) each 
with a possibly different outcome. As no individual can be observed in both of 
these two states at the same time, there is always a non-observed state, which is 
called the counterfactual. 
Let D be an indicator for treatment, which takes the value one if a person is 
treated and zero otherwise. The treatment effect ATTτ  for a treated individual 
would be the difference of his outcome with treatment ( )1(iY ) and without the 
treatment ( )0(iY ):  
]1)0([]1)1([]1)0()1([ =−===−= iiiiiiiATT DYEDYEDYYEτ      (1) 
The outcome of an individual can never be observed in the treatment and the 
non-treatment state at the same time, so that the causal effect in equation (1) 
one is unobservable. This identification problem needs to be resolved. Under cer-
tain assumptions a comparison of the outcomes of treatment group members 
with very similar control members identify the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT).9 
Propensity Score Matching is one approach to identify such effects. We follow the 
discussion of the approach by Becker/Ichino (2002): Let us define the propensity 
score according to Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability of 
treatment where iX  is a vector of observables at values prior to treatment. 
]1[]1[)( iiiii XDEXDPXP ====  ,        (2) 
In this context some conditions have to hold for identifying the treatment effect: 
the condition of balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score 
( )(XPXD ⊥ ). According to this condition observations with the same propensity 
score have the same distribution of observables; given pre-treatment character-
                                                
9 The decision on which effect to estimate depends on the research question. Heckman/ 
LaLonde/Smith (1999) discuss further parameters. 
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istics, treatment is random and treatments and control units do on average not 
differ with respect to pre-treatment characteristics. Next, there are the conditions 
of unconfoundedness ( XYY ⊥)0(),1( ) and of unconfoundedness given the propen-
sity score ( )()0(),1( XPYY ⊥ ). Unconfoundedness is also labelled as the condi-
tional independence assumption (CIA) and states that outcomes in case of treat-
ment and non-treatment are independent from actual assignment to treatment 
given the propensity score. 
If treatment is random within cells defined by the vector X , it is also random 
within such cells defined by the values of propensity score )(XP , which in con-
trast to X  has only one dimension. Given the above conditions, we have 
{ }
{ }1|)](,0|)0([)](,1|)1([
)](,1|)0()1([
]1|)0()1([
==−==
=−=
=−=
iiiiiii
iiii
iiiATT
DXPDYEXPDYEE
XPDYYEE
DYYEτ
     (3) 
The basic idea of the matching estimator is to substitute the unobservable ex-
pected outcome without treatment of the treated ]1|)0([ =ii DYE  by an observ-
able expected outcome of a suitable control group )](,0|)0([ iii XPDYE =  that has 
the same distribution of the propensity score as the treatment group. To imple-
ment a matching estimator, it requires the additional assumption of common 
support 
1)|1(0 <=< XDP ,           (4) 
since for individuals whose probability of treatment is either 0 or 1, no counter-
factual can be found. Finally, the "stable unit treatment value assumption" 
(SUTVA) has to be made. It states that the individual's potential outcome only 
depends on his own participation and not on the treatment status of other indi-
viduals. It implies that there are neither general equilibrium nor cross-person 
effects. In our context there is certainly reason to question this assumption. 
Since a large number of individuals are treated, we would expect that the out-
comes without treatment are also affected, e.g., because in the short-term the 
number of vacancies is fixed. If treatment leads to vacancies being filled more 
quickly by treated individuals, the job search process of the non-treated may be 
prolonged.  
We estimate the ATT effects at different points in time after programme start 
(t=0):  
}1|)](,0|)0([{)](,1|)1([ 0,0,0,,0,0,,, ==−== iiitiiititATT DXPDYEEXPDYEτ      (5) 
As propensity score matching estimators we use nearest neighbour and radius 
matching imposing common support. Both techniques select for each treatment 
observation one or more comparison individuals from a potential control group. 
The following equation defines these estimators10 
                                                
10 For simplicity we leave away the subscript t for time after programme start. 
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)0()1(1τ ,      (6) 
where treatedN  is the number of treated persons. ijw  is a weight defined as 
controlsi
ij N
w
,
1=  ,            (7) 
where controlsiN ,  represent the number of controls matched to the i
th treated per-
son. With nearest neighbour matching, this number is chosen by the researcher: 
e.g., for each treated individual from the control group five neighbours are cho-
sen whose propensity score differs less from that of the treated individual than 
those of all other control group members. In case of radius matching, all control 
group individuals are chosen whose propensity score does not differ in absolute 
terms from the one of the treatment individual by more than a given distance. In 
that case the number of matched controls may differ for each treatment individ-
ual. For the analytical variances and hence the standard errors of these estima-
tors see Becker/Ichino (2002). When carrying out the analysis we followed the 
outline from Caliendo and Kopeinig (2006). 
5.2 Data 
For the CIA to hold good data are important. It is not enough thinking about 
good estimators (Heckman et al., 1998) but a data source that is rich in terms of 
information on individual characteristics and in particular on their programme 
participation and other labour market outcomes is essential. Characteristics on 
the individual’s household are an important addition to such information. The 
data in use are administrative data of the German Federal Employment Agency 
that were prepared for scientific use at the Institute for Employment Research 
and contain the mentioned information on a daily basis. We use samples of the 
"Integrated Employment Biographies" (IEB).11 Individual information about em-
ployment and unemployment history, daily earnings, occupation, education, and 
active labour market programme history is available in these data. We addition-
ally rely on information of a job-seeker data base (“Bewerberangebotsdatei”) that 
provides information on socio-demographic characteristics.12  
Many evaluation studies of active labour market programmes rely on administra-
tive data. In contrast to most of these studies, we have the information just de-
scribed not only for the persons of the treatment and control group but also for 
members of their needy household. This information is available since the benefit 
reform of the year 2005, as a new way of registering members of means-tested 
households was introduced. As a consequence, a new data set, the “Unemploy-
ment Benefit II Receipt History”, which contains spells of means-tested benefit 
receipt on all members of a needy household together with a household identifier 
is available. Hence, our set of covariates that potentially determines the propen-
                                                
11 The data exclude the 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of ad-
ministering the unemployment benefit II. For them systematic information on pro-
gramme participation is not available. 
12 In particular we computed covariates on family status, children, migration background 
and health status with information from this data base. 
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sity is a lot richer than that of many other comparable studies. This is particularly 
important to justify the Conditional Independence Assumption. 
For the treatment group we use the total inflow into One-Euro-Jobs from Febru-
ary to April 2005 of persons who were both registered unemployed and ‘unem-
ployment benefit II’ recipients at the end of January 2005. We only consider un-
employed persons aged 15 to 62 years, since older unemployment benefit II re-
cipients do nearly never enter One-Euro-Jobs and we want to avoid keeping per-
sons in the sample who enter their old-age-pension within our observations win-
dow. The potential controls stem from a 20 percent random sample of unem-
ployment benefit II recipients who were unemployed at 31st January 2005 and 
who did not enter the One-Euro-Job programmes from February to April 2005. 
For the control group members naturally no programme start is available over 
this period. Therefore, we computed a random programme start for the controls 
such that it follows the distribution of programme starts of the treatment group 
over these months and excluded those controls from our analyses who exited 
from unemployment before the calcuted random programme start.13,14  
The data on the outcomes was constructed from two data sources. We used in-
formation on contributory employment and whether people are registered as un-
employed or as job-seekers from an additional data set, the “Verbleibsnach-
weise”. These administrative data have one great advantage over the IEB, which 
also contains such information. They provide the information for a more recent 
past (e.g., at the time we carried out our analysis the IEB contained information 
on all contributory employment currently only until the end of the year 2005 and 
the “Verbleibsnachweise” until May 2007). This is important since we deal with a 
relatively recent treatment and need to observe outcomes for a sufficiently long 
period of time after treatment. Combining these data with information on partici-
pation of our sample members in ALMPs allows us to compute whether the sam-
ple members hold an unsubsidized job of contributory employment at different 
points in time. We label this variable “regular employment”. By combining these 
data, the observation window for this outcome contains 20 months after pro-
gramme start. It is 12 months longer than it would have been, if we had relied 
on IEB information only. The “Verbleibsnachweise” also allow an observation 
window of 25 months after programme start for our second outcome variable 
“neither registered as unemployed nor as job-seeker” which is five months longer 
than that of the IEB. 
                                                
13 When computing the random programme start, we took into account differences of 
the distribution of programme starts between men and women in East and West Ger-
many. If between 31st of January 2005 and their (computed or true) programme start 
control or treatment group members already exited from unemployment (e.g., due to 
some other programme participation), they were dismissed from our samples. 
14 The data collected by the UB II agencies at the beginning of the year 2005 is certainly 
characterised by some measurement error. This is not surprising, given that more 
than three million needy households with more than six million benefit recipients had 
to be registered according to the new system. In particular, a new software, “A2ll”, 
was introduced to register basic information on benefits and other traits of the needy 
households and their members. Not all UB II agencies provided complete information 
at the beginning of the year 2005 with this software according to the Statistical De-
partment of the Federal Employment Agency. Therefore to some extent the daily in-
formation is not precise. Dates of individual events like the start or end of benefit re-
ceipt may not always have been reported or do not precisely reflect the true dates. 
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The information on the third outcome variable “unemployment benefit receipt” 
stems from another data set, the “Unemployment Benefit II Receipt History” 
(Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung) and is available for 24 months after pro-
gramme start. 
The sample sizes of treatments and controls are displayed in Table 1 and are 
considerable. Overall we have more than 70,000 treated. The smallest group are 
West German women with more than 9,000 participants. For men and women in 
East or West Germany, there are between 51,000 and 102,000 individuals as po-
tential controls. 
6 Results: Average treatment effects on the 
treated of One-Euro-Jobs 
6.1 Implementation 
We present results for the ATT generally for four groups: men and women in East 
Germany and in West Germany in order to take into account gender differences 
and the considerable differences between the East and West German labour mar-
kets. Apart from estimating the effects for these four broad samples, we also 
take into account additional effect heterogeneity. We regard four different age 
groups (15-24, 25-35, 36-50 and 51-62 years), and Germans without versus 
Germans with migration background and foreigners and for West Germany also 
foreigners with different nationalities. Next, we distinguish between three occu-
pational qualification groups (no qualification, apprenticeship/vocational training 
and higher qualification) and regions with low, intermediate or high unemploy-
ment rates. Moreover, we distinguish between people who ended their last regu-
lar contributory employment in the year 2004, the years 2001 to 2003, 1992 to 
2000 and before 1992 or who were never employed. The sample sizes of these 
different groups are also presented in Table 1.  
We investigate the effects of participation in a One-Euro-Job on three different 
outcome variables at different points in time after programme start to have a 
comprehensive insight into the effects of the programme. First, we investigate 
the effect of participation on the probability of being regularly employed (i.e. un-
subsidised contributory employment). Second, we observe whether the persons 
in our sample are registered as unemployed or job-seeker. The second outcome 
compared to the first includes participation in active labour market programmes 
as participants are registered as a job seeker in the majority of cases. Thus, a 
person who is neither registered as unemployed nor as job-seeking can be a) 
regularly employed with a working time of 15 hours a week or more, for more 
than three months and earning sufficiently to live on or b) they have no longer 
registered as unemployed or job-seeking. Hence, this outcome variable by and 
large can be interpreted as an indicator for either being employed in a regular 
and rather stable job or being out of the labour force. Third, we observe whether 
the household of the person still receives unemployment benefit II. If the house-
hold no longer receives UB II, this can be because the household is no longer 
needy or because the household stopped applying for benefits. For the first pos-
sibility there can be several reasons: the person in our sample or other members 
in the person’s household achieve earnings, such that the household no longer 
passes the means-test. Various changes in the household composition may also 
lead to such a result. E.g., a person in our sample moves to another household 
with sufficient earnings. 
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For each of the analysed groups we estimated one probit model for the probabil-
ity to participate in One-Euro-Jobs. The covariate sets in these analyses contain 
personal characteristics (age, nationality, migration status, health indicators, 
whether the person is single, number of children and qualification), labour mar-
ket and unemployment benefit history (indicators on unemployment, non-
employment, and regular employment periods in the past, UI and UA receipt, 
past participation in active labour market programmes, characteristics of the last 
job, whether a person has a minor employment in January 2005), characteristics 
of the partner (labour market history and qualification) and finally regional char-
acteristics (dummy variables reflecting a classification of the labour market situa-
tion developed by Rüb and Werner (2007) and some further controls at district 
level: unemployment rate, share of long-unemployment in the unemployment 
pool, ratio between the vacancy and the unemployment stock in January 2005 
and their percentage change against the previous year). These characteristics 
should make it likely that the treatment and control outcomes given the propen-
sity scores differ only due to treatment and hence the unconfoundedness condi-
tion holds.  
In particular partner characteristics are new in this context, as administrative 
data are usually weak on such information. Partner characteristics play a role for 
the employment decisions but also for outcomes like “no receipt of UB II”, e.g., a 
UB II recipient with a highly in contrast to a low skilled partner is more likely to 
exit from UB II, when the partner finds a job. 
The probit models that we estimated rely on the described set of covariates. 
Nevertheless, the exact specification of covariate sets differs over the sub-
groups. This is first of all because the lower the sample sizes, the broader some 
variables (e.g., dummy variables for age groups) have to be defined. Second, for 
the samples that we regard, a number of covariates are highly insignificant and 
have been deleted.15 In Table 2 we present the coefficients of the four probit 
models that distinguish between East and West German men and women. The 
coefficients of probit models that underlie the estimation of the ATTs for the addi-
tional subgroups like estimates for different age groups are not presented in this 
paper; they are available on request. 
6.2 Match Quality, Sensitivity Analysis 
Rosenbaum Bounds 
Our results are based on the assumption of unconfoundedness. If there are any 
unobserved variables that influence selection into the programme as well as out-
come variables of the programme a hidden bias could occur and matching esti-
mators would not be robust. The basic idea behind Rosenbaum Bounds is that 
the odds of treatment of two matched individuals is one, given that they are 
characterised by the same observables.16 If there are neglected unobserved fac-
                                                
15 We estimated in all cases a probit model with a full variable set and tested whether 
groups of variables, e.g., binary variables for the last monthly earnings or the last 
economic sector were jointly insignificant.  
16 
)](1/[)(
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−
−
 would represent the odds of treatment of two matched individuals 
i and j with the same covariate vectors. 
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tors that influence the participation probabilities though, these odds of treatment 
could change, e.g., to a value two. With the help of Rosenbaum bounds we can 
conduct an analysis that determines how sensitive our results are to the influence 
of an unobserved variable. It shows how strong neglected unobserved factors 
have to change the odds ratio, so that we overestimate or underestimate the 
treatment effect. 
We computed the Mantel-Haentzel statistic using the Stata Programme 
“mhbounds” by Becker/Caliendo (2007). We calculated the test statistic QMH for 
the three outcomes in every observed month after programme start for each 
sample we considered. Here we report the bounds for the outcome regular em-
ployment and for the four broad groups of men and women in East and West 
Germany in the 20th month only. These are the bounds for nearest neighbour 
matching with one neighbour and without replacement, as the mhbounds com-
mand can only be applied for nearest neighbour matching without replacement or 
for stratification matching (Becker/Caliendo 2007). 
The results are quite sensitive to a potential hidden bias: for men in East and 
West Germany we find that participation has an insignificant effect on the em-
ployment rate after 20 months after programme start. Unobserved factors that 
lead to odds ratios of 1.05 or 1.10 are sufficient to produce positive or negative 
significant effects. Effects of East German women are sensitive to a factor of 
1.05. Less sensitive are the positive treatment effects of West German women. 
Unobservable influences that change the odds ratio up to a factor of 1.15 would 
still be in line with a significant effect at a 10%-level and at a factor of 1.20 they 
become insignificant. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis do not mean that a bias actually exists but 
that matching results are sensitive to possible deviations from the assumption of 
unconfoundedness and thus one has to be careful in interpreting the results. 
However, the treatment effects we obtained are weak und thus it is not surpris-
ing that they are sensitive to a potential bias. 
Common support 
Furthermore for propensity score matching we have to assume that there is a 
common support which means that the propensity score should lie between zero 
and one and that the distributions of the propensity score are similar for treat-
ment and control groups. In Figure 1 and 2 the distributions of the propensity 
score are displayed for men and women in East and West Germany and it be-
comes obvious that distributions for control and treatment group are very similar. 
Sensitivity to matching methods 
We estimated the ATT using different matching estimators, nearest neighbour 
one-to-one matching with and without replacement and nearest neighbour 
matching with replacement using five neighbours. First, each estimation was car-
ried out without caliper. We estimated the 90th and 99th percentile of the differ-
ences between the propensity score of treatments and controls (in absolute 
terms) in each application. These percentiles were then used as 1st and 2nd cali-
per leaving out the worst one and ten percent of matches. Furthermore, we esti-
mated the ATT radius-caliper matching with the same percentiles that resulted 
from nearest neighbour one-to-one matching with replacement. This analysis 
confirmed that our estimation results are quite stable over the different methods. 
Deviations tend to be small and only in a few cases and at few points in time 
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they are outside the 95 percent confidence band of the nearest neighbour esti-
mator with five neighbours and with replacement. We present results based on 
this latter estimator. 
Balancing 
As we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, we have to 
check the balancing of the relevant variables. Therefore we applied several 
measures that give us information on the balancing. The standardised absolute 
bias measures the distance in the marginal distribution of the covariates. Table 3 
displays the standard absolute bias as an average over all covariates. Before 
matching, the biases for the four broad groups of men and women in East and 
West Germany range from seven to eleven percent and for the smaller subgroups  
from about seven up to 22 percent. After matching the bias does not exceed 0.5 
percent for the four broad samples and decreases for the subgroups to values 
between 0.4 and 4.1 percent. However, for most subgroups the bias falls below 
the value of two percent. 
Besides the standardised bias for all covariates we checked the matching quality 
for single covariates. Tables 4 to 7 display the mean of the covariates for treat-
ments, all controls and matched controls for men and women in East and West 
Germany. Furthermore, the p-values of a t-test on the hypothesis that the mean 
of a given covariate is the same for the control and the treatment group are dis-
played for all covariates. The results demonstrate that after matching there are 
no significant differences between treatment and control group in any of the 
variables. 
6.3 Overall effects 
The ATT for the four broad subgroups are shown in Figure 3 and Table 9 to Table 
11. We present the results for the three outcomes regular employment, neither 
being unemployed nor a job-seeker and no receipt UB II. The results stem from 
nearest neighbour matching with replacement which matches five individuals 
from the control group to a treated individual. Standard errors were bootstrapped 
with 100 repetitions. Note though that Abadie/Imbens (2006) showed that in 
nearest neighbour matching applications bootstrapped standard errors are not 
valid in general.  
According to Figure 3 there are locking-in effects in the short: In the first ten 
months after programme start participants have a lower probability of being 
regularly employed than comparable non-participants. However, at around six 
months after the start of the programme the estimated ATTs for the employment 
rate starts to rise. For women in East and West Germany positive effects appear 
after 16 (West) and 19 months (East). They are well-determined 20 months after 
programme start, implying that the employment rate of participants is raised by 
one percentage point for East German women and 2.7 percentage points for 
West German women. So for them One-Euro-Jobs participation is effective when 
it comes to integrating them into the regular labour market.  
The policy is ineffective with respect to integrating men into employment during 
the first 20 months after programme start. And it generally performs worse for 
participants in East Germany than for participants in West Germany. This may be 
due to the different economic performance of the two regions and the resulting 
differences between their labour markets. If there are less job vacancies per un-
employed person, locking-in effects as well as positive effects could be smaller. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
22
Also other reasons may explain the East-West difference: In the East in contrast 
to West One-Euro-Jobs are presumably more a relief for long-term non-employed 
similar to traditional job creation schemes and less a means of improving em-
ployability. 
The programme effects of the employment outcome are weak in the first 20 
months after programme start. This holds in particular for the locking-in effect, if 
we contrast our findings to those of Caliendo (2005a) on job creation schemes in 
Germany. They find for example locking-in effects that imply a roughly 20 per-
centage points reduction of the employment rate at around eight months after 
programme start for West German public works participants. Our strongest lock-
ing-in effect emerged for women in West Germany at minus three percentage 
points. Since, One-Euro-Job participation lasts frequently six months or less, 
while public works participation in the above mentioned study rather lasted one 
year, the length of programme participation is one reason for these differences. 
Another reason is that needy One-Euro-Job participants are with respect to job 
finding perspectives a much less positive selection of people from the unemploy-
ment pool than the public works participants in the study of Caliendo et al. 
(2005a). Moreover, the difference could also partly be explained by an incentive 
effect. Job creation schemes provide participants with a wage, while in One-Euro-
Jobs they receive just their UB II and a small compensation. Additionally, work-
ing time in One-Euro-Jobs is limited to 30 hours per week which means that 
there is more time left for participants for job search and thus, locking-in effects 
are supposed to be reduced. 
Regarding the other two outcome variables only negative effects can be ob-
served. That means that participants have a higher probability of being regis-
tered unemployed or job seeking and of receiving UB II than comparable non-
participants. In the short-run the negative impact on the probability of being nei-
ther unemployed nor job-seeking is not surprising since participants are counted 
as job-seeking while they participate in a One-Euro-Job.  
The enduring negative effects on the outcomes not registered as unemployed nor 
as a job-seeker and no UB II receipt after two years are stronger than the posi-
tive ones on the probability of being regularly employed 20 months after pro-
gramme start. The rate of no UB II receipt is reduced by about two to three per-
centage points two years after programme start for the participants. Hence, 
treatment does not avoid UB II receipt. One reason for this result could be that 
One-Euro-Jobs participants in contrast to comparable persons more frequently 
find jobs that pay low wages and jobs that are only temporary and in case of 
women only part-time. If the programme has some threat effect on participants, 
they may well have reduced their reservations wages as mentioned in section 
four. In turn, even with a (slight) positive effect on their employment rate after 
participation ended, One-Euro-Job participation still raises the job-seeker rate of 
participants. Moreover, the achieved post-participation earnings are often low 
enough to pass the means-test for UB II receipt. As soon as we have earnings 
information for a sufficient period of time, we can shed more light on this latter 
hypothesis. 
There may even be more reasons for the negative effects of treatment on the no-
job-seeker rate and the no UB II receipt rate. One-Euro-Job participants who 
have specific difficulties of finding a job may be likely to participate in other ac-
tive labour market programmes after One-Euro-Job ended, as it is only one of 
the first steps in achieving employability. Moreover, comparable non-participants 
maybe more likely to retreat temporarily or permanently from the labour market 
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than participants. E.g., without One-Euro-Job participation young people more 
frequently enter full-time education and aged people more frequently choose the 
early retirement option. Finally, changes in household formation may explain the 
results partly: People who are not subject to activation policies could more fre-
quently change their household composition in a way such that leads the house-
hold out of UB II receipt.  
We will shed some more light on these issues, in particular on the earnings ac-
cepted after participation and reservations wages, when more micro data on the 
characteristics of the jobs become available. Currently the administrative data 
provides us only with wage information for the year 2005, but in one year they 
will offer us the possibility to study earnings about 20 months after programme 
start. Moreover, panel data of a new household panel survey that oversamples 
needy households will enable us in the future to regard, whether participation 
has an impact on reservations wages of participants.  
6.4 Effects by Age 
As previously mentioned young unemployed under the age of 25 years are a spe-
cial target group of Social Code II and of One-Euro-Jobs in particular. In the first 
half of the year 2005 among needy unemployed people aged younger than 25 
years every fourth person started a One-Euro-Job (Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006). For 
this age group we observe locking-in effects that are stronger than for any other 
age group (Table 9 to Table 11). One year after programme start young partici-
pants have a probability of being regularly employment that is 2.1 to 2.7 per-
centage points lower than the probability for comparable benefit recipients who 
did not participate (Table 9). And these effects are statistically significant. 
20 months after programme start the effects on the employment rate are still 
negative for men in both regions and women in East Germany, while for women 
in West Germany they are positive. But in all cases they are not well determined. 
For young women we observe a strong negative effect on neither being unem-
ployed nor job-seeking: they have a ten to eleven percentage points higher 
probability of being registered as unemployed or job-seeking one year after pro-
gramme start (Table 10). This may point to the fact that without treatment 
women under 25 retreat more frequently from the labour market (e.g., due to 
child rearing or full-time education). 
Table 9 shows that locking-in effects for the outcome regular job decline in age, 
when we regard the effects 12 months after programme start, i.e. the month in 
which nearly all programme participations are completed. This decline is not sur-
prising. The probability of finding a job tends to decrease over the age groups for 
needy unemployed people (Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006). A significant positive ATT for 
the employment rate can be observed for some participant groups above the age 
of 25 years. For East German women and West German men, treatment raises 
the employment rate by about one to 1.5 percentage points for the age groups of 
36 to 50 and 51 to 62 years. Our estimates also imply a positive and somewhat 
stronger treatment effect ranging from 2.2 to 4.3 percentage points for West 
Germans who belong to the age groups 25 to 35, 36 to 50 and 51 to 62 years. 
The highest effect occurred for West German women aged 25 to 35 years. 
Unemployed people aged 50 years or older are a special target group for the 
work-opportunity programmes, due to their relatively low job finding probabil-
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ity.17 But the policy framework does not generally aim at activating aged unem-
ployed workers. There are specific rules for unemployed people who are older 
than 57 years. They are allowed to opt for the earliest possible retirement and in 
turn do not have to sign an integration contract or be available for job offers.18 
Moreover, since July 2005 a special One-Euro-Job programme was implemented 
for this age group. The upper limit for the duration of participation in this special 
programme is three years. Integrating needy aged workers into the regular la-
bour market is not the only goal of this specific programme, because such an in-
tegration often cannot be achieved for above 57 year olds. Thus, it aims at using 
the older unemployed persons’ professional experience (in jobs of public interest) 
and provides them with an alternative to being unemployed, which should ideally 
be combined with a retirement transition (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affaires 2005).  
Nevertheless, our results show that for needy unemployed people aged 51 to 62 
years, treatment can raise their employment rates. Moreover, they are also the 
age group for which the rate of neither being registered as unemployed nor as a 
job-seeker decreases considerably due to treatment. 25 months after programme 
start this rate is about seven to ten percentage points lower than for the matched 
controls according to our results displayed in Table 10. Hence, participation in-
deed leads to avoiding or postponing the decision to retreat from the labour mar-
ket.  
Finally, in West Germany 51 to 62 years olds are the only age-group, where we 
find that the ATT on the rate of no UB II receipt is near zero and hence not (sig-
nificantly) reduced as for all the other groups (Table 11). The negative estimated 
ATT on the no UB II receipt rate for East Germans aged 51 to 62 years may be 
due to the fact that East Germans more frequently than West Germans qualify 
for early retirement. Wübbeke (2007) shows that aged East German UB II recipi-
ents are characterised by higher contribution periods to the statutory pension 
funds than West Germans. In turn they are more likely to fulfil the eligibility cri-
terion for early retirement of a contribution period 15 years or more. Hence, in 
case of not participating in Euro-Jobs East Germans in contrast to West Germans 
could more frequently opt for early retirement and exit for this reason from un-
employment benefit II receipt.  
                                                
17 Despite the definition as a target group unemployed who are older than 49 were not 
especially focussed on by One-Euro-Jobs in 2005 (Wolff/Hohmeyer 2006). 
18 This is regulated in Article 65 paragraph 4 SGB II and Article 428 SGB III. The earliest 
retirement age for unemployed people was 60 years in the year 2005, provided they 
have been unemployed for at least 12 months after an age of 58 years and six months 
(Article 237 Social Code VI). To be eligible for this early retirement option they need 
to have contributed to the statutory pension insurance funds for at least 15 years and 
at least eight years in the ten years prior to early retirement. Over the period from 
2006 to 2008 though this early retirement age will be gradually increased to 63 years.  
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
25
6.5 Effects by Nationality 
The results for Germans without migration background, Germans with migration 
background19 and foreigners show the following: In East Germany the estimated 
ATTs for the employment outcome are small 20 months after programme start; 
only for women without migration background they are well-determined but nev-
ertheless below one percentage point as displayed by Table 9. The estimated 
ATTs for East Germans with respect to the outcome “no UB II receipt” point to 
adverse affects of the programme participation 24 months after programme 
start: For all groups there is a negative impact (Table 11). It is particularly high 
in absolute terms for Germans with migration background whose rate of “no UB 
II receipt” is decreased by more than four percentage points for men and more 
than six percentage points for women by treatment. It is also high for foreign 
women in East Germany at more than four percentage points. 
For West Germany, the sample sizes allowed us to distinguish between different 
groups of foreigners. We distinguished between foreigners from the former So-
viet Union, Turks and all other foreigners. Our results imply positive effects of 
treatment on the regular employment rate of Germans with no migration back-
ground of 0.7 percentage points for men and 2.2 percentage points for women 
20 months after programme start. For West German women with migration 
background the estimated ATT is considerably higher at nearly seven percentage 
points. For the different groups of foreigners the effects are not-well determined 
and only considerable for the group of all other foreigners at values between two 
and three percentage points 20 months after programme start. 
Nevertheless, also in West Germany One-Euro-Job participation does not lead 
more people out of benefit receipt as the estimated ATTs for the outcome “no UB 
II receipt” in Table 11 demonstrate. 24 months after programme start the effects 
are mostly negative and at the same time for Germans, men of Turkish national-
ity or men and women in the group of other foreigners well determined.  
6.6 Effects by occupational qualification 
Qualification is considered as one crucial factor determining a person’s labour 
market performance. People with no occupational degree have particular difficul-
ties in finding a job. They could benefit from One-Euro-Job participation by ac-
cumulating basic skills and hence by raising their employability. However, for 
men in both regions and women in East Germany without occupational degree we 
find that participation is ineffective, with near zero or slightly negative effects 20 
months after programme start as displayed in Table 9. Only for unskilled West 
German women the estimated ATT for the employment rate is well determined 
and positive at 2.5 percentage points. 
The ATTs on the employment rate for participants with vocational training and 
higher occupational degrees tend to be higher than for the unskilled participant 
                                                
19 The data does not only allow to identify whether persons are of German or foreign 
nationality. For Germans the job-seeker data base provides also limited information on 
their migration background. It allows to identify immigrants with German ancestors 
who became German nationals as well as asylum-seekers and specific types of refu-
gees, who became German nationals. Such people define our group of people with mi-
gration background. 
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group. But only for the highest qualification group and only for women in East 
and West Germany with ATTs on the employment rate 20 months after pro-
gramme start of three and more than four percentage points, respectively, the 
difference to the effect for the unskilled group is substantial (see Table 9). This 
could reflect that for high-skilled women there is an effect that is rather due to a 
work-test than due to impacts on employability.20  
For the other two outcomes our estimated ATTs are negative for each qualifica-
tion group men and women in both region and usually well-determined even 
more than 20 months after programme start (Table 10 and 11). Even though for 
women we found a difference between the impacts on the employment rate of 
the highest and lowest skill group of roughly two to three percentage points, 
there is nearly no difference between them when we regard the ATTs on the ef-
fects of UB II receipt 24 months after programme start. For East German women 
the estimated ATTs imply that the rate is reduced by three percentage points for 
the low skilled group and 3.4 percentage points for the group with the highest 
skills. The corresponding values for West German women are 3.1 and 2.8 per-
centage points. We interpret these latter results as evidence that the programme 
effect for high skilled women implies a reduction in reservation wages. Due to 
treatment some of them have accepted regular wage offers that they otherwise 
would have rejected.  
6.7 Effects by regional unemployment rate 
The ATTs for the employment rate do not vary much according to the regional 
unemployment rate, where the treatment takes place (Table 9). Moreover, the 
results displayed in Table 9 do not show that participation is more effective for 
the treated in low compared with higher unemployment regions. We would have 
regarded this as evidence for the impact of treatment on employability, which at 
least in low but not necessarily in high unemployment regions should lead to in-
creased employment rates of the treated. But our results are not in line with this 
hypothesis. 
6.8 Effects by time since last employment 
The One-Euro-Job programme is designed for needy unemployed people who 
have very low chances of finding a job. People who were out of employment for 
quite some time are no longer used to regular work-schedules and presumably 
also no longer motivated to search for jobs. For such people and not for people 
with a recent experience in the labour market a One-Euro-Job participation 
should be quite beneficial.  
The estimated ATTs for the employment outcome displayed in Table 9 are much 
in favour of the above hypothesis: For men and women in East or West Germany 
who worked in unsubsidized contributory employment in the year 2004, the pro-
gramme is ineffective. First of all, the ATTs 12 months after programme start are 
                                                
20 Our results are based on a sample of people aged 15 to 62 years. Hence, many sam-
ple members with no occupational qualification are still very young and may complete 
some qualification. Therefore, we estimated also the ATTs for all three qualification 
groups with a sample of people aged 25 to 62 years. The results of this analysis differ 
only little from the results on the ATTs that we present. Hence, the qualitative implica-
tions of both analyses are by and large the same.  
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all negative and point to much higher locking-in effects than for all groups of 
people who ended their last regular job, before the year 2004. Moreover, even 20 
months after programme start the employment rate of those with a regular job in 
2004 is (significantly) reduced by about three percentage points for men 1.5 to 
2.3 percentage points for women.  
In contrast to needy participants with recent employment, treatment is effective 
for needy people in West Germany if their last regular job ended in the years 
2001 to 2003. The treatment effect is 1.8 percentage points for men and 2.7 
percentage points for women 20 months after programme start. Both in the East 
and the West the policy is also effective for the treated whose last job ended be-
tween the years 1992 and 2000. They are the group with the highest treatment 
effect for women in both regions and for men in West Germany. For West Ger-
man women the treatment effect is quite substantial at about six percentage 
points 20 months after programme start. The effects for those who were never 
employed or whose last employment ended before 1992 tend to be lower than 
for those last employed between 1992 and 2000, but are still positive and for 
West German women also significant.  
Nevertheless, the employment success of participation for some of these groups 
is not translating into a success in terms of avoiding “UB II receipt” during our 
observation window of two years after programme start. The estimated ATTs for 
that outcome are negative for all of them and nearly always significant as shown 
in Table 11.  
7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed the effects of One-Euro-Job participation on the labour 
market performance of participants. As this is a recently introduced programme, 
this question has not been studied yet. We consider participants who started a 
One-Euro-Job in spring 2005 and who have been unemployed and receiving UB II 
at the end of January 2005. We applied Propensity Score Matching using admin-
istrative data of the Federal Employment Agency. These data have several ad-
vantages over other data sources. First, we have a large number of observations 
available that allows us to control for personal heterogeneity. Second, the data 
include information on household members of benefit recipients, which makes 
the underlying assumption of conditional independence of the matching estimator 
more plausible. 
We estimated the ATT separately for men and women and East and West Ger-
many due to the different labour market conditions in both German regions. 
Moreover, we estimated the ATTs distinguishing different groups of participants 
according to age, migration background, occupational qualification, regional un-
employment rate and time since last job. This analysis identifies for which par-
ticipant groups the programme is effective and there are various reasons to ex-
pect that its effectiveness varies between specific groups of people. To have a 
comprehensive insight in the effects of One-Euro-Jobs on the labour market per-
formance of participants we estimated the ATT for three different outcome vari-
ables: the regular employment rate, being neither registered as unemployed nor 
as job-seeker and no unemployment benefit II receipt. 
Our results suggest the following: First of all, regarding the outcome regular em-
ployment there are locking-in effects of programme participation. This is not sur-
prising for a programme of median duration of six months. However, compared 
with earlier evaluation results of the public works programme, the locking-in ef-
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fects are quite small. The likely reason for this is that public works programme 
participation lasts longer - usually rather for a year - and the participants receive 
a wage and not only their unemployment benefit and a few Euros more.  
Second, regarding our broad samples, only for women and in particular West 
German women, the participation at some point after programme start raises the 
employment rate. For East German women we observed that at the end of our 
observation window, where 20 months after programme start the employment 
rate is raised by one percentage points. For West German women the corre-
sponding number is 2.7 percentage points and the positive effects occur already 
four months earlier than for East German women. Compared to the effects on the 
participants of other programmes such as wage subsidies and within-company 
training the treatment effects of the One-Euro-Jobs are relatively small. How-
ever, this is what can be expected considering the special group of participants in 
One-Euro-Jobs and bearing in mind that One-Euro-Jobs have to be additional and 
of public use and thus are not that close to regular employment. 
Third, the programme is ineffective with respect to avoiding that people are reg-
istered as unemployed or job-seekers and avoiding unemployment benefit II re-
ceipt. One potential reason for the latter result is that One-Euro-Job participants 
find frequently lower paid jobs than the comparable non-participants. In turn the 
achieved earnings in regular jobs of the One-Euro-Job participants are less fre-
quently sufficient to exit benefit receipt than for the controls. Hence, the pro-
gramme presumably reduces the reservation wages of participants. Moreover, 
the non-participants may also more frequently take other routes out of unem-
ployment benefit II receipt than the One-Euro-Jobs participants; e.g. by changing 
to a household with sufficiently high income or by opting for early retirement in 
case of older benefit recipients. 
Fourth, we find that there are some groups of participants for which One-Euro-
Jobs are quite effective, while for others the participation is rather ineffective.  A 
high variation of the effect is observed for participants of different age. For par-
ticipants aged younger than 25 years the effects on the employment rate tend to 
be negative and lower than for the other age-groups. Such deviations are par-
ticularly high for West German women: The ATT 20 months after programme 
start is only about one percentage points for the under 25 year olds and between 
2.2 and 4.3 percentage points for the other age-groups.  
For the employment outcome the ATTs do not vary that much by qualification or 
the regional unemployment rate. However, they vary considerably with time 
since last job. For participants who lost their last job in 2004, the treatment ef-
fect is negative for both gender and regions 20 months after programme start 
(the decrease ranges from 1.5 to about three percentage points). For those who 
lost their job before the year 2004 or who were never regularly employed the 
opposite is true. They are highest for West German women who lost their last 
contributory job between 1992 and 2000 at more than five percentage points. 
As One-Euro-Jobs are supposed to help the participants to learn the basic pre-
conditions for work, we assumed that they are particularly effective for those un-
employed with low employment chances. However, with respect to this hypothe-
sis we find mixed results. On the one hand, participation in a One-Euro-Job is 
ineffective for participants without an occupational  qualification. On the other 
hand, participation integrates unemployed into the labour market who have not 
been employed for several years. This is a group that should also have particular 
difficulties in finding a regular job. 
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Moreover, the analysis of some specific participant groups implies that locking-in 
effects tend to be stronger for those unemployed with relatively good chances of 
finding a job without treatment. For example, locking-in effects are stronger in 
West than in East Germany. Young unemployed people under the age of 25 years 
are a special target group of One-Euro-Jobs. Locking-In effects for young unem-
ployed are higher than for any other age group. Even in the medium term, young 
unemployed people do not benefit from participation in a One-Euro-Job. This 
gives reason to reconsider the targeting on young unemployed persons. 
The policy implications are only partly straightforward: The programme is effec-
tive for West German women, and some groups of participants with low chances 
of finding a job like those aged 51 to 62 years or those who were not recently 
employed. For a special target group, the under 25 year olds, the One-Euro-Jobs 
are rather ineffective. Given these results one may argue that the share of par-
ticipants in the One-Euro-Job programme should become higher for the groups 
for which it is most effective. Though there are some further effects to be consid-
ered: As the programme serves also as a work-test, the adverse effects for some 
groups of participants may be due to a threat effect that raises the job search 
efforts already without participation. This is likely for population groups with rela-
tively high chances of finding jobs and a high likelihood of participating in One-
Euro-Jobs, e.g., for the under 25 year olds.  
There are many questions that future research should shed some light on. First 
of all, since the available time horizon after programme start is still short, we 
need to extend the analysis in order to see whether participation is effective in 
the medium-term. Second, the treatment effects of additional outcomes like 
earnings and stable versus unstable employment will be quantified. Third, we did 
not address the question of programme heterogeneity: E.g., is the programme 
more effective for participants in full-time or part-time One-Euro-Jobs. Finally, 
our results cannot show whether the programme is effective on a macro basis in 
the sense of raising the employment rates in regular jobs or reducing the job-
seeker rate or rate of means-tested benefit receipt.  
References 
Abadie, Alberto, and Guido W. Imbens (2006): “On the Failure of the Bootstrap 
for Matching Estimators”, National Bureau of Economic Research Technical 
Working Paper No. 0325. 
Becker, Sascha. O., and Marco Caliendo (2007): “Sensitivity Analysis for Average 
Treatment Effects”, The Stata Journal, 7(1), 71-83. 
Becker, Sascha O., and Andrea Ichino (2002): “Estimation of Average Treatment 
Effects based on Propensity Scores ”, The Stata Journal, 2(4), 358-377. 
Böckmann-Schewe, Lisa, and Anne Röhrig (1997): “Hilfe zur Arbeit. Analyse der 
Wirksamkeit öffentlich geförderter Beschäftigung der SozialhilfeempfängerIn-
nen”, Düsseldorf. 
Blos, Kerstin, and Helmut Rudolph (2005): “Simulationsrechnungen zum Arbeits-
losengeld II - Verlierer, aber auch Gewinner”, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung Kurzbericht Nr. 17/2005, Nürnberg. 
Bolvig, Iben, Peter Jensen, and Michael Rosholm (2003): “The Employment Ef-
fects of Active Social Policy”, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper 
No. 736. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
30
Caliendo, Marco (2006): “Microeconometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies”, 
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 568, Springer,  
Berlin. 
Caliendo, Marco, Reinhard Hujer, and Stephan Thomsen (2005a): “The Employ-
ment Effect of Job Creation Schemes in Germany: A Microeconometric Evalua-
tion”, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper, 1512, Bonn. 
Caliendo, Marco, Reinhard Hujer, and Stephan Thomsen (2005b): “Individual 
Employment Effects of Job Creation Schemes in Germany with Respect to  
Sectoral Heterogeneity”, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung  
Discussion Paper No 13/2005, Nürnberg. 
Caliendo, Marco, and Sabine Kopeinig (2006): “Some Practical Guidance for the 
Implementation of Propensity Score Matching”, forthcoming in Journal of Eco-
nomic Surveys. 
Calmfors, Lars (1994): “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment - A 
Framework for the Analysis of Crucial Design Features”, OECD Labour Market 
and Social Policy Occasional Paper No. 15, Paris. 
Calmfors, Lars, Anders Forslund, and Maria Hemström (2002): “Does Active  
Labour Market Policy Work? Lessons from the Swedish Experiences”, Institute 
for Labour Market Policy Evaluation Working Paper 2002: 4. 
Federal Employment Agency (2005): “Arbeitshilfe zur Umsetzung von Arbeits- 
gelegenheiten nach § 16 Abs. 3 SGB II” (as at 2nd September 2005). 
Federal Employment Agency (2006): “Sozialgesetzbuch Zweites Buch – Grund- 
sicherung für Arbeitsuchende, Jahresbericht 2005: Zahlen, Daten, Fakten”, 
Nürnberg. 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires (2005): “Merkblatt zur Fortsetzung 
der Bund-Länder-Initiative zur Bekämpfung der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit Älterer 
durch Förderung von bis zu dreijährigen Zusatzjobs (29th Dezember 2005)”. 
Gerfin, Michael, and Michael Lechner (2001): “A Microeconometric Evaluation of 
the Active Labour Market Policy in Switzerland”, The Economic Journal, 
112(482), 854-893. 
Gueron, Judith M., and Edward Pauly (1991): “From Welfare To Work”, New York.  
Hagen, Tobias, and Viktor Steiner (2000): “Von der Finanzierung der Arbeits- 
losigkeit zur Förderung von Arbeit. Analysen und Empfehlungen zur Arbeits-
marktpolitik in Deutschland”, ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen, 51, Nomos Verlags- 
gesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 
Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeffrey Smith, and Petra Todd (1998): 
“Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data”, Econometrica,  
66(5), 1017-1098. 
Heckman, James, Richard LaLonde, and Jeffrey Smith (1999): “The Economics 
and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programmes”, in Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume III, ed. By O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card: 1865-2097.  
Amsterdam, North Holland. 
Heinemann, Sarah, Hermann Gartner, and Eva Jozwiak (2006): “Arbeitsförde-
rung für Langzeitarbeitslose. Erste Befunde zu Eingliederungsleistungen des 
SGB III im Rechtskreis SGB II”, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
Forschungsbericht Nr. 3/2006, Nürnberg. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
31
Hohmeyer, Katrin, Christoph Schöll, and Joachim Wolff (2006): “Arbeitsgelegen-
heiten in der Entgeltvariante. Viele Zielgruppen werden noch vernachlässigt”, 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung Forschungsbericht Nr. 22/2006, 
Nürnberg. 
Jacobi, Lena, and Jochen Kluve (2007): “Before and After the Hartz Reforms:  
The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany”, Institute for  
the Study of Labor Discussion Paper, 2100, Bonn. 
Kempken, Jürgen, and Achim Trube (1997): “Effektivität und Effizienz sozial- 
orientierter Hilfen zur Arbeit. Lokale Analysen aktivierender Sozialhilfe”,  
Lit Verlag, Münster. 
Lissenburgh, Stephen (2001): “New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed Pilots: 
Quantitative Evaluation Using Stage 2 Survey”, Employment Service Report 
ESR 81, Sheffield. 
Lodemel, Ivar (2000): “Work Integration through Obligations to Work”, Paper 
presented at the UWWCLUS Workshop Brussels. 
Lodemel, Ivar (2005): “Workfare”, CESifo Dice Report 2/2005. 
Ochel, Wolfgang (2004): “Welfare-To-Work Experiences With Specific Work-First 
Programmes In Selected Countries”, CESifo Working Paper No. 1153, Munich. 
Rosenbaum, Paul R., and Donald B. Rubin (1983): “The Central Role of the  
Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects”, Biometrika, 
70(1), 41-55. 
Roy, Andrew D. (1951): “Some Thoughts on The Distribution of Earnings”,  
Oxford Economic Papers, 3(2), 135-145. 
Rubin, Donald B. (1974): “Estimating Causal Effects to Treatments in Random-
ised and Nonrandomised Studies”, Journal of Educational Psychology, 66(5), 
688-701. 
Rüb, Felix, and Daniel Werner (2007): “Typisierung von SGB II-Trägern”,  
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung Forschungsbericht Nr. 1/2007, 
Nürnberg. 
Sianesi, Barbara (2004): “An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active Labour 
Programmes in the 1990s”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 
133-155. 
Trube, Achim (1994): “Fiskalische und soziale Aspekte kommunaler Arbeits-
marktpolitik - Eine vergleichende Analyse sozioökonomischer Effekte von Ar-
beitslosigkeit und Beschäftigungsförderung vor Ort”, Arbeit und Sozialpolitik, 
7-8/94 
Voges, Wolfgang, Herbert Jacobs, and Heather Trickey (2001): “Uneven Devel-
opment - Local Authorities and Workfare in Germany”, in An Offer you Can't 
Refuse: Workfare in International Perspective, ed. by Lodemel, Ivar, and 
Heather Trickey: 71-103. The Policy Press, Bristol, United Kingdom. 
Wolff, Joachim, and Katrin Hohmeyer (2006): “Förderung von arbeitslosen Per-
sonen im Rechtskreis des SGB II durch Arbeitsgelegenheiten: Bislang wenig 
zielgruppenorientiert”, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung For-
schungsbericht Nr. 10/2006, Nürnberg. 
Wübbeke, Christina (2007): “Einmal arm, immer arm?”, Institut für Arbeits-
markt- und Berufsforschung Kurzbericht Nr. 14 /2007, Nürnberg. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
32
Tables and figures 
Table 1: Sample sizes of treated and potential controls 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
    
Treat-
ment Control 
Treat-
ment Control 
Treat-
ment Control 
Treat-
ment Control 
    Group Group Group Group Group Group Group Group 
Total sample 21,267 60,513 19,111 51,215 20,968 102,310 9,470 70,990
Age             
  15-24 5,084 4,604 3,339 3,777 4,582 7,716 2,109 6,661
  25-35 3,527 15,029 3,314 11,927 5,023 26,461 2,137 18,679
  36-50 8,735 28,710 8,977 25,027 8,836 47,094 4,148 31,306
  51-62 3,913 12,170 3,474 10,484 2,537 21,039 1,074 14,344
Nationality                 
  German 20,241 54,458 18,212 46,213 16,920 73,064 7,881 50,844
  
German, 
migrants 414 1,430 347 1,459 1,281 5,948 548 4,229
  Foreigner 597 4,625 546 3,543  -  -  -  - 
  former USSR  -  -  -  - 459 2,614 225 3,019
  Turkish1)  -  -  -  - 881 8,383 280 4,910
  other foreigners  -  -  -  - 1,413 12,142 520 7,772
Qualification              
  no qualification 6,513 18,470 4,529 16,047 12,238 57,297 5,159 45,208
  apprenticeship 14,019 39,150 13,293 32,172 8,053 40,098 3,692 21,882
  higher  730 2,893 1,284 2,996 681 4,915 618 3,900
Unemployment 
rate2)             
  low 5,798 10,289 4,663 8,979 5,722 27,163 2,439 18,448
  intermediate1 5,009 20,657 4,349 15,959 4,882 16,073 2,248 11,145
  intermediate2 4,795 12,403 4,701 10,871 5,145 25,631 2,210 17,361
  high 5,656 17,164 5,385 15,406 5,213 33,443 2,556 24,036
Last regular job in             
  2004 2,929 9,052 1,844 4,792 3,958 15,562 1,596 9,082
  2001-2003 7,247 20,244 4,622 12,158 8,967 43,028 3,616 22,286
  1992-2000 7,826 24,155 8,977 23,727 4,664 28,365 1,810 15,335
  <1992 or never 3,259 7,062 3,652 10,538 3,368 15,355 2,445 24,287
                    
 
1) Only persons aged younger than 58 years. 
2) Unemployment rate in January 2005 (district level); low East G. “<=21%“, low West  
G. “<=10.5%“, intermediate1 East G. “21-22%“, intermediate1 West G. “10.5-12%“, 
intermediate2 East G. “22-23.5%“, intermediate2 West G. “12-14.5%“, high East G. “>23.5%“, 
high West G. “>14.5%“. 
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Table 2:  Probit coefficients of One-Euro-Job participation equation 
                    
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
                    
Age in years (reference is 15-19) 
  21-24 -0.004   0.028   -0.052 * 0.005   
  25-30 -0.889 *** -0.680 *** -0.613 *** -0.446 *** 
  31-35 -0.790 *** -0.598 *** -0.613 *** -0.446 *** 
  36-40 -0.770 *** -0.577 *** -0.613 *** -0.407 *** 
  41-45 -0.717 *** -0.577 *** -0.613 *** -0.366 *** 
  46-50 -0.717 *** -0.545 *** -0.627 *** -0.453 *** 
  51-57 -0.761 *** -0.596 *** -0.750 *** -0.575 *** 
  58-62 -0.980 *** -0.823 *** -1.024 *** -0.903 *** 
Health (reference is no impairment) 
  Impairment of health -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.057 *** -0.053 *** 
  Disability .   -0.056 * -0.056 *** -0.047   
Nationality (reference is German, no migration background) 
  German with migration background -0.145 *** -0.192 *** -0.118 *** -0.115 *** 
  Turkish -0.426 *** -0.373 *** -0.340 *** -0.274 *** 
  Soviet Union -0.077 ** -0.028   -0.143 *** -0.274 *** 
  other foreigners -0.365 *** -0.260 *** -0.264 *** -0.209 *** 
Partner and children                 
  No partner -0.006   0.029   0.020   0.209 *** 
  Partner, not married -0.016   .   -0.001   0.159 *** 
  One child -0.003   0.054 *** -0.023 * 0.004   
  Two children 0.024   0.079 *** -0.025 * -0.004   
  Three and more children -0.032   0.049 ** -0.001   0.000   
Education 
(reference is no secondary schooling degree/no voca-
tional training) 
  Secondary school, no vocational education 0.026   0.111 *** 0.004   0.070 *** 
  Secondary school, vocational education 0.050 *** 0.172 *** -0.015   0.105 *** 
  GCSE, no vocational training -0.019   0.112 *** -0.015   0.076 *** 
  GCSE, vocational training 0.006   0.184 *** -0.015   0.076 *** 
  A-levels, no vocational training -0.052   -0.007   -0.125 *** 0.076 *** 
  A-levels, vocational training 0.034   0.176 *** -0.044 * 0.076 *** 
  A-levels, college -0.032   0.090 *** -0.140 *** 0.076 *** 
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is zero to six months) 
  7 to 9 months 0.107 *** 0.159 *** 0.088 *** 0.129 *** 
  10 to 12 months 0.135 *** 0.131 *** 0.088 *** 0.129 *** 
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 6 months 0.129 *** 0.047 * 0.156 *** 0.089 *** 
  7 to 12 months 0.129 *** 0.047 * 0.156 *** 0.125 *** 
  13 to 18 months 0.129 *** 0.080 ** 0.156 *** 0.125 *** 
  19 to 24 months 0.163 *** 0.080 ** 0.156 *** 0.157 *** 
  25 to 30 months 0.126 *** 0.112 *** 0.156 *** 0.157 *** 
  31 to 36 months 0.082 ** 0.081 ** 0.123 *** 0.107 *** 
  37 to 48 months 0.051   0.040   0.123 *** 0.138 *** 
Out-of-labour force during last year -0.061 *** -0.049 *** -0.039 *** -0.066 *** 
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Table 2 continued: Probit coefficients of One-Euro-Job participation equation 
                    
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor UB (reference is zero months) 
receipt (proxy for out-of-the labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004 
  1 to 6 months -0.062 *** -0.069 *** -0.054 *** -0.037 ** 
  7 to 12 months -0.098 *** -0.069 *** -0.095 *** -0.104 *** 
  13 to 18 months -0.055 *** -0.104 *** -0.095 *** -0.073 *** 
  19 to 24 months -0.055 *** -0.054 ** -0.095 *** -0.030   
  25 to 30 months -0.105 *** -0.054 ** -0.095 *** -0.030   
  31 to 36 months -0.105 *** 0.007   0.000   0.038   
  37 to 42 months -0.027   0.007   0.025   0.038   
  43 to 60 months -0.082 ** -0.017   0.025   0.038   
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005   
  1 to 3 months -0.064 *** -0.045 ** -0.053 ***  .   
  4 to 6 months -0.032   -0.045 ** -0.053 ***  .    
  7 to 9 months -0.032   -0.087 *** -0.053 ***  .   
  10 to 12 months -0.032   -0.019   -0.002    .   
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004   
  1 to 3 months 0.010   0.016    .   -0.027   
  4 to 6 months 0.010   -0.033 **  .    -0.027   
  7 to 12 months 0.010   -0.008    .   -0.050 ** 
  13 to 18 months 0.059 *** 0.063 ***  .   -0.106 *** 
  > 18 months 0.059 *** -0.029    .   -0.106 *** 
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 3 months 0.035   -0.047   -0.001   0.084 ** 
  4 to 6 months 0.035   -0.047   -0.043   0.084 ** 
  7 to 9 months -0.040   -0.110 *** -0.095 *** 0.024   
  10 to 12 months -0.040   -0.089 ** -0.079 *** 0.073   
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 6 months -0.034 * -0.050 ** -0.029 * 0.009   
  7 to 12 months -0.034 * -0.083 *** -0.015   -0.062 ** 
  13 to 18 months -0.034 * -0.119 *** -0.015   -0.121 *** 
  19 to 24 months -0.034 * -0.119 *** -0.015   -0.121 *** 
  25 to 30 months -0.034 * -0.119 *** -0.060 *** -0.121 *** 
  31 to 36 months -0.034 * -0.159 *** -0.060 *** -0.182 *** 
  37 to 42 months -0.034 * -0.159 *** -0.060 *** -0.233 *** 
  43 to 48 months -0.087 *** -0.159 *** -0.139 *** -0.270 *** 
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 -0.093 *** .    .   0.098 *** 
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.051 ** 0.208 *** 0.076 *** 0.068 * 
Cumulated dur. of regular employment, 01/2000 to 
12/2004 (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 6 months 0.023   0.032 * 0.080 *** 0.025   
  7 to 12 months -0.018   -0.011   0.063 *** -0.018   
  13 to 18 months -0.050 ** -0.065 *** 0.063 *** -0.018   
  19 to 24 months -0.080 *** -0.150 *** 0.037   -0.086 ** 
  25 to 30 months -0.140 *** -0.150 *** 0.037   -0.128 *** 
  31 to 36 months -0.234 *** -0.150 *** 0.037   -0.128 *** 
  37 to 42 months -0.178 *** -0.150 *** 0.037   -0.128 *** 
  43 to 60 months -0.323 *** -0.326 *** -0.085 ** -0.243 *** 
                    
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 32/2007   
 
35
Table 2 continued: Probit coefficients of One-Euro-Job participation equation 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
Interaction terms with age below 25 years                 
  < 25 with vocational training  -   -0.131 ***  -    -   
  
< 25, <= 12 months not in labour force in the last 5 
years   -   0.077    -    -   
  
< 25, 12 to 24 months not in labour force in the last 5 
years   -   0.219 *** 0.025    -   
  
< 25, > 24 months not in labour force in the last 5 
years   -   0.219 *** -0.046    -   
  < 25, 0 up to 12 months regular employment  -   -0.119 *** -0.134 *** -0.068 ** 
  < 25, > 12 months regular employment  -   -0.119 *** -0.134 *** -0.068 ** 
  < 25, > 1 year of unemployment in the last 5 years  -0.090 ***  -    -    -   
ALMP participation in last five years (yes)                 
  Job creation schemes 0.074 *** 0.093 *** 0.153 *** 0.143 *** 
  Private employment subsidy -0.112 *** -0.140 *** -0.075 *** -0.069 ** 
  Further vocational training 0.014   0.029 ** 0.017   0.052 *** 
  Retraining -0.029   -0.043    -    -   
  Short-term training (classroom) -0.015   -0.022   0.034 *** 0.018   
  Short-term training (practical) -0.029 * -0.024   0.022   0.043 * 
  Other short-term training 0.044    -   0.041   0.045   
  Startup subsidy -0.183 *** -0.217 *** -0.204 *** -0.241 *** 
  
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of pla-
cement  -   -0.107 *** -0.032 * -0.070 *** 
  
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of place-
ment  -   -0.033   -0.035 * -0.057 ** 
  Other ALMP 0.158 *** 0.108 *** 0.163 *** 0.169 *** 
Time since end of last ALMP (reference is up to 12 months) 
  13 to 24 months  -   -0.070 *** -0.011   -0.033 * 
  > 24 months  -   0.029 ** 0.044 *** 0.038 * 
ALMP in last year 0.059 *** 0.121 *** 0.067 *** 0.101 *** 
Number of ALMP participations in the last five years (reference is no programme participation) 
  One 0.077 *** 0.101 *** 0.089 *** 0.065 *** 
  Two 0.136 *** 0.178 *** 0.120 *** 0.119 *** 
  Three 0.160 *** 0.178 *** 0.174 *** 0.119 *** 
  Four  0.160 *** 0.213 *** 0.174 *** 0.177 *** 
  Five and more 0.160 *** 0.213 *** 0.236 *** 0.262 *** 
Industry of last contributory job (reference is other manufacturing) 
  Job with missing sector -0.043   -0.111 *** -0.010   -0.021   
  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and 
water supply 0.018   -0.111 *** 0.198 *** -0.021   
  Food and tobacco 0.018   -0.111 *** 0.006   -0.021   
  Wood, paper, publishing, printing 0.018   -0.048   0.006   -0.021   
  Chemical industry, engineering, vehical construction 0.018   0.077   0.006   -0.021   
  Construction -0.084 *** -0.133 *** 0.006   0.049   
  Wholesale trade and car sales -0.084 *** -0.026   -0.044 *** -0.050   
  Retail trade and hotels/restaurants -0.084 *** -0.162 *** -0.044 *** -0.016   
  Transport and communication -0.023   -0.094 ** -0.044 *** -0.016   
  Services for companies -0.023   -0.035   0.044 ** 0.035   
  
Public adminstration, defense, social security agen-
cies 0.131 *** 0.091 *** 0.291 *** 0.170 *** 
  Education -0.003   -0.014   0.187 *** 0.170 *** 
  Health care, veterinarian and social services 0.116 *** 0.062 ** 0.228 *** 0.170 *** 
  Other services 0.052 ** 0.003   0.103 *** 0.069 ** 
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Table 2 continued: Probit coefficients of One-Euro-Job participation equation 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
Last professional status (reference is blue-collar worker) 
  Skilled worker / foreman -0.043 *** -0.002   -0.055 *** -0.038   
  White-collar worker -0.043 *** -0.002   -0.111 *** -0.081 ***
  Part-time -0.031 ** 0.024 * -0.010   -0.045 ***
  No job yet 0.097 ** -0.130 *** 0.036   -0.018   
Size of last establishment (reference is 1 to 20 employees) 
  21 to 50 employees 0.011   0.038 ** 0.046 *** 0.037 ** 
  51 to 100 employees 0.011   -0.007   0.064 *** 0.075 ***
  101 to 200 employees 0.011   -0.007   0.034 *** 0.039 ** 
  201 to 400 employees 0.025   -0.007   0.034 *** 0.039 ** 
  > 400 employees -0.033 ** -0.007   0.034 *** 0.039 ** 
  Missing -0.006   -0.007   -0.012   -0.014   
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100) (reference is 0 Euro) 
  >0 to 500 Euro 0.087 ** 0.040   0.126 *** 0.109 ***
  >500 to 1000 Euro 0.152 *** 0.073 *** 0.162 *** 0.109 ***
  >1000 to 1500 Euro 0.126 *** 0.098 *** 0.162 *** 0.109 ***
  >1500 to 2000 Euro 0.083 *** 0.032   0.094 *** 0.109 ***
  > 2000 Euro 0.015   -0.006   0.038 * 0.024   
Time since end of last contributory job (reference is one to six months) 
  7 to 12 months 0.029   0.011   0.001   -0.007   
  13 to 24 months 0.076 *** 0.011   0.001   -0.007   
  25 to 36 months 0.076 *** -0.036   0.001   -0.007   
  37 to 48 months 0.023   -0.036   -0.028   -0.063 ** 
  > 48 months 0.023   -0.036   -0.066 *** -0.063 ** 
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 
12/2004 (reference is less than seven months) 
  7 to 12 months 0.042 *** 0.015   0.004   0.012   
  13 to 18 months 0.042 *** 0.046 ** -0.043 *** 0.012   
  19 to 24 months 0.042 *** 0.080 *** -0.043 *** 0.012   
  25 to 36 months 0.017   0.080 *** -0.043 *** -0.051   
  37 to 60 months 0.102 ** 0.080 *** -0.037   -0.051   
Number of contributory jobs in last five years (reference is no job) 
  One -0.003   -0.035   -0.086 *** -0.045   
  Two 0.035   0.038   -0.086 *** -0.045   
  Three 0.035   0.078 * -0.086 *** 0.008   
  Four or more 0.035   0.078 * -0.086 *** 0.008   
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 -0.294 *** -0.349 *** -0.279 *** -0.318 ***
Partner information                 
Partner was unemployed between 01/2000 to 12/2004 for (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 12 months 0.052 ** 0.004    -    -   
  13 to 24 months 0.052 ** 0.044 *  -    -   
  25 to 30 months 0.052 ** 0.044 *  -    -   
  31 to 36 months 0.095 *** 0.016    -    -   
  37 to 42 months 0.005   0.016    -    -   
  43 to 60 months 0.005   -0.033    -    -   
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Table 2 continued: Probit coefficients of One-Euro-Job participation equation 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
Partner not empl. or job-seeker in the last 5 years for (reference is zero months) 
  1 to 12 months -0.047 *** -0.036 ** -0.013    -   
  13 to 24 months -0.047 *** -0.067 ** 0.026    -   
  25 to 30 months -0.047 *** -0.007   0.086 ***  -   
  31 to 36 months -0.047 *** -0.098 *** 0.086 ***  -   
  37 to 42 months -0.047 *** -0.098 *** 0.086 ***  -   
  43 to 60 months -0.047 *** -0.098 *** 0.086 ***  -   
Partner education 
(reference is no secondary schooling degree/no voca-
tional training) 
  Secondary school, no vocational education 0.017    -   -0.004   0.000   
  Secondary school, vocational education 0.017    -   -0.004   0.044   
  GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college -0.011    -   -0.004   -0.018   
  Missing: no partner IEB identifier 0.040    -   -0.117 *** -0.097 *** 
  Missing for other reasons -0.029    -   -0.077 *** -0.097 *** 
Regional variables (district level)                 
  Local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.009 *** -0.007 *** 0.015 *** 0.025 *** 
  %age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.005 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
  
Percentage of long-term-unemployment (LTU) in Jan. 
2005  -   0.003 ** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
  %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.009 *** -0.013 *** -0.003 ***  -   
  Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 3.678 *** 3.479 *** -0.344 **  -   
  %age change vacancy-unempl. ratio  in Jan. 2005  -   0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000   
Classification of region (according to Rüb, et al. 2007) 
(reference is cities with below average lab. market 
cond./high long-term unemployment) 
  
Cities in West Germany with average labour market 
(LM) conditions  -    -   0.216 *** 0.232 *** 
  Cities in West G. with above-average LM conditions  -    -   0.331 *** 0.320 *** 
  Urban areas with average LM cond. 0.516 *** 0.407 *** 0.159 *** 0.165 *** 
  Rural areas in West G. with average LM conditions  -    -   0.306 *** 0.346 *** 
  Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.251 *** 0.222 *** 0.139 *** 0.207 *** 
  
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM condi-
tions and high seasonal dynamics  -    -   0.594 *** 0.477 *** 
  
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond., sea-
sonal dynamics and low LTU  -    -   0.449 *** 0.354 *** 
  Rural areas in W.G., very fav. LM cond. & low LTU  -    -   0.449 *** 0.412 *** 
  Rural areas in East G. with severe LM conditions 0.179 *** 0.126 ***  -    -   
  Rural areas in East G. with very severe LM conditions 0.073 *** 0.051 **  -    -   
Other                 
  Looking for part-time job  -   -0.065 ***  -   -0.103 *** 
  Constant -1.134 *** -1.426 *** -1.574 *** -2.191 *** 
Number of observations 81781 70327 123291 80464 
Log of the Likelihood -18309.8 -16527.2 -18826.1 -8873.1 
Pseudo-R2 0.076 0.068 0.080 0.085 
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Table 3:  Standardised absolute bias1),2) 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
    before after before after before after before after
    matching matching matching matching 
Total sample 7.9 0.4 7.0 0.4 9.6 0.3 11.0 0.5 
Age                 
  15-24 10.4 0.8 11.0 1.2 9.3 1.0 15.8 1.3 
  25-35 8.8 0.7 10.1 0.5 7.6 0.5 12.1 0.9 
  36-50 7.2 0.4 8.4 0.4 7.3 0.5 10.9 0.8 
  51-62 9.9 0.7 11.0 0.7 12.1 0.9 13.0 1.2 
Nationality                 
  German 7.6 0.4 6.6 0.4 9.3 0.4 10.3 0.6 
  German, migrants 9.1 2.1 11.1 2.5 13.5 1.0 12.6 1.8 
  Foreigner 15.0 2.6 15.8 4.1  -  -  -  - 
  former USSR  -  -  -  - 13.2 2.0 17.6 3.4 
  Turkish3)  -  -  -  - 13.3 1.3 22.9 2.3 
  Other foreigners  -  -  -  - 10.6 1.1 15.7 1.7 
Qualification                  
  no qualification 10.8 0.7 9.4 0.8 9.2 0.5 13.0 0.7 
  apprenticeship 8.0 0.5 6.7 0.4 8.5 0.5 8.7 0.7 
  higher  11.9 2.2 10.5 1.2 9.7 1.2 12.1 1.2 
Unemployment rate4)                 
  low 8.7 0.9 7.7 0.9 10.2 0.7 11.6 0.9 
  intermediate1 11.3 0.6 10.7 0.8 8.2 0.6 12.2 0.8 
  intermediate2 9.0 0.8 8.1 1.0 12.6 0.7 14.4 1.0 
  high 8.7 0.9 7.8 0.7 10.2 0.7 13.2 0.9 
Last regular job in                 
  2004 13.4 1.1 10.3 1.2 9.9 0.6 10.5 1.0 
  2001-2003 7.7 0.5 6.8 0.6 7.9 0.4 7.9 0.7 
  1992-2000 8.8 0.5 8.5 0.5 10.7 0.6 10.5 0.9 
  <1992 or never 17.4 1.3 15.3 1.0 15.2 0.9 16.9 1.0 
 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (5 neighbours). 
2) Standardised Bias: )]()([5.0/)(100 XVXVXX controlstreatcontrolstreat +⋅−⋅ . 
3) Only persons aged younger than 58 years. 
4) Unemployment rate in January 2005 (district level); low East G. “<=21%“, low West 
G. “<=10.5%“, intermediate1 East G. “21-22%“, intermediate1 West G. “10.5-
12%“,intermediate2 East G. “22-23.5%“, intermediate2 West G. “12-14.5%“, high East 
G. “>23.5%“, high West G. “>14.5%“. 
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Table 4:  Match quality for covariates - men East Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Age in years           
21-24 0.191 0.055 0.189 0.000 0.575
25-30 0.085 0.134 0.085 0.000 0.752
31-35 0.080 0.114 0.081 0.000 0.820
36-40 0.112 0.149 0.113 0.000 0.783
41-50 0.298 0.325 0.302 0.000 0.445
51-57 0.173 0.182 0.176 0.006 0.579
58-62 0.011 0.019 0.010 0.000 0.440
Health           
Impairment of health 0.122 0.140 0.123 0.000 0.687
Nationality           
Disability 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.001 0.747
German with migration background 0.007 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.364
Turkish 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.000 0.689
Other foreigners 0.011 0.037 0.010 0.000 0.424
Partner and children           
No partner 0.637 0.587 0.638 0.000 0.897
Partner, not married 0.114 0.115 0.113 0.567 0.774
One child 0.116 0.133 0.117 0.000 0.753
Two children 0.070 0.079 0.071 0.000 0.716
Three and more children 0.029 0.039 0.029 0.000 0.669
Vocational education           
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.132 0.117 0.133 0.000 0.664
Secondary school, vocational education 0.327 0.291 0.327 0.000 0.972
GCSE, no vocational training 0.048 0.046 0.048 0.111 0.899
GCSE, vocational training 0.329 0.353 0.333 0.000 0.387
A-levels, no vocational training 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.740
A-levels, vocational training 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.002 0.709
A-levels, college 0.018 0.028 0.017 0.000 0.825
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005           
7 to 9 months 0.182 0.143 0.183 0.000 0.748
10 to 12 months 0.682 0.706 0.686 0.000 0.312
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2004           
13 to 18 months 0.308 0.267 0.306 0.000 0.621
19 to 24 months 0.136 0.120 0.137 0.000 0.801
25 to 30 months 0.141 0.129 0.141 0.000 0.793
31 to 36 months 0.140 0.139 0.143 0.534 0.420
37 to 48 months 0.237 0.293 0.239 0.000 0.639
Neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment benefit receipt           
Out-of-labour force during last year 0.194 0.212 0.191 0.000 0.379
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment benefit           
receipt (proxy for out-of-the labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.249 0.284 0.251 0.000 0.786
7 to 12 months 0.107 0.092 0.106 0.000 0.619
13 to 24 months 0.087 0.077 0.086 0.000 0.576
25 to 36 months 0.052 0.049 0.052 0.077 0.730
37 to 42 months 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.599
43 to 60 months 0.050 0.056 0.047 0.002 0.153
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Table 4 continued: Match quality for covariates  - men East Germany  
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 3 months 0.073 0.066 0.073 0.001 0.967
4 to 12 months 0.174 0.148 0.172 0.000 0.588
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 12 months 0.557 0.523 0.556 0.000 0.967
> 12 months 0.202 0.176 0.206 0.000 0.307
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 6 months 0.209 0.157 0.209 0.000 0.987
7 to 12 months 0.625 0.647 0.630 0.000 0.283
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 42 months 0.631 0.608 0.637 0.000 0.219
43 to 48 months 0.075 0.114 0.076 0.000 0.918
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.033 0.046 0.032 0.000 0.590
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.800 0.774 0.805 0.000 0.219
Cumulated dur. of regular employment, 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.198 0.166 0.198 0.000 0.944
7 to 12 months 0.116 0.105 0.116 0.000 0.820
13 to 18 months 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.993 0.913
19 to 24 months 0.052 0.058 0.052 0.004 0.913
25 to 30 months 0.037 0.046 0.037 0.000 0.806
31 to 36 months 0.021 0.034 0.020 0.000 0.470
37 to 42 months 0.015 0.022 0.015 0.000 0.768
43 to 60 months 0.010 0.027 0.009 0.000 0.316
Interaction terms with age below 25 years           
under 25, more than 12 months unemployment 0.098 0.028 0.096 0.000 0.540
ALMP participation in last five years (yes)           
Job creation schemes 0.359 0.249 0.365 0.000 0.190
Private employment subsidy 0.092 0.101 0.091 0.000 0.701
Further vocational training 0.243 0.204 0.244 0.000 0.858
Retraining 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.660 0.394
Short-term training (classroom) 0.346 0.304 0.346 0.000 0.954
Short-term training (practical) 0.113 0.096 0.115 0.000 0.415
Other short-term training 0.030 0.015 0.030 0.000 0.670
Startup subsidy 0.014 0.025 0.014 0.000 0.895
Other ALMP 0.100 0.051 0.097 0.000 0.252
ALMP during last year 0.430 0.303 0.429 0.000 0.758
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Table 4 continued: Match quality for covariates  - men East Germany  
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Number of ALMP participations in the last five years           
One 0.264 0.274 0.265 0.005 0.831
Two 0.248 0.208 0.249 0.000 0.748
Three or more 0.302 0.219 0.303 0.000 0.793
Industry of last contributory job           
Job with missing sector 0.071 0.127 0.072 0.000 0.735
Agric./forestry/fishing, mining/energy/water supply, food, tobacco, 
wood, paper, publishing, printing, chemical ind., engineering, 
vehical industry 
0.100 0.087 0.098 0.000 0.483
Construction, wholesale trade, retail trade and hotels/restaurants 0.176 0.239 0.177 0.000 0.786
Transport and communication, Services for companies 0.159 0.165 0.160 0.033 0.741
Public adminstration, defense, social security agencies 0.079 0.049 0.080 0.000 0.634
Education 0.070 0.051 0.070 0.000 0.811
Health care, veterinarian and social services 0.041 0.027 0.041 0.000 0.981
Other services 0.135 0.111 0.137 0.000 0.715
Last professional status           
Skilled worker / foreman, White-collar worker 0.333 0.406 0.333 0.000 0.982
Part-time 0.201 0.160 0.202 0.000 0.802
No job yet 0.123 0.098 0.119 0.000 0.189
Size of last establishment           
21 to 200 employees 0.386 0.358 0.391 0.000 0.275
2001 to 400 employees 0.126 0.102 0.125 0.000 0.828
> 400 employees 0.104 0.114 0.105 0.000 0.902
Missing 0.035 0.045 0.035 0.000 0.899
Last monthly real wage (defined with CPI, 2000=100)           
>0 to 500 Euro 0.048 0.046 0.049 0.169 0.932
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.310 0.246 0.307 0.000 0.548
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.358 0.365 0.365 0.078 0.143
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.103 0.144 0.104 0.000 0.894
> 2000 Euro 0.039 0.070 0.038 0.000 0.621
Time since end of last contributory job           
7 to 12 months 0.106 0.084 0.104 0.000 0.571
13 to 36 months 0.343 0.301 0.346 0.000 0.600
>36 months 0.286 0.385 0.291 0.000 0.253
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 
12/2004           
7 to 24 months 0.440 0.403 0.442 0.000 0.722
25 to 36 months 0.023 0.034 0.023 0.000 0.680
37 to 60 months 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.000 0.448
Number of jobs in last five years           
One 0.428 0.402 0.427 0.000 0.858
two or more 0.336 0.314 0.339 0.000 0.595
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 0.045 0.086 0.045 0.000 0.708
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Table 4 continued: Match quality for covariates  - men East Germany  
            
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Partner information           
Partner was unemployed between 01/2000 to 12/2004 for           
1 to 30 months 0.142 0.157 0.141 0.000 0.672
31 to 36 months 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.209 0.995
37 to 60 months 0.113 0.131 0.114 0.000 0.838
Partner not empl. or job-seeker in the last 5 years for           
25 to 60 months 0.227 0.271 0.226 0.000 0.810
Partner education           
Secondary school, with and without vocational education 0.103 0.107 0.103 0.105 0.921
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.102 0.117 0.101 0.000 0.820
no ieb_konto_id 0.046 0.052 0.047 0.001 0.804
Missing 0.079 0.093 0.078 0.000 0.860
Regional variables (district level)           
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 22.634 22.967 22.613 0.000 0.566
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 8.217 8.337 8.199 0.001 0.686
%age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -3.067 -2.962 -3.007 0.028 0.299
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.410 0.736
Urban areas with average labour amrket cond. 0.019 0.007 0.018 0.000 0.328
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.129 0.082 0.130 0.000 0.858
Rural areas in East Germany with severe LM conditions 0.367 0.298 0.369 0.000 0.728
Rural areas in East Germany with very severe LM conditions 0.149 0.167 0.146 0.000 0.507
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Table 5: Match quality for covariates - women East Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
            
Age in years           
21-24 0.130 0.050 0.126 0.000 0.241
25-30 0.073 0.110 0.076 0.000 0.240
31-35 0.101 0.123 0.100 0.000 0.865
36-45  0.318 0.338 0.319 0.000 0.923
46-50 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.808 0.833
51-57 0.174 0.190 0.178 0.000 0.394
58-62 0.008 0.014 0.008 0.000 0.953
Health           
Impairment of health 0.079 0.094 0.079 0.000 1.000
Disability 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.297 0.794
Nationality           
German with migration background 0.018 0.028 0.019 0.000 0.855
Turkish 0.005 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.536
Soviet Union 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.000 0.905
Other foreigners 0.009 0.030 0.009 0.000 0.442
Partner and children           
No partner 0.571 0.520 0.564 0.000 0.184
One child 0.275 0.267 0.275 0.029 0.896
Two children 0.178 0.180 0.179 0.479 0.704
Three and more children 0.063 0.075 0.064 0.000 0.779
Vocational education           
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.102 0.113 0.105 0.000 0.464
Secondary school, vocational education 0.223 0.204 0.222 0.000 0.716
GCSE, no vocational training 0.059 0.062 0.060 0.100 0.616
GCSE, vocational training 0.494 0.434 0.497 0.000 0.493
A-levels, no vocational training 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.814
A-levels, vocational training 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.094 0.995
A-levels, college 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.000 0.680
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005           
7 to 9 months 0.165 0.114 0.166 0.000 0.724
10 to 12 months 0.701 0.714 0.703 0.001 0.719
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 12 months 0.175 0.161 0.176 0.000 0.970
13 to 24 months 0.205 0.186 0.205 0.000 0.917
25 to 30 months 0.122 0.102 0.123 0.000 0.806
31 to 36 months 0.134 0.118 0.136 0.000 0.486
37 to 48 months 0.306 0.349 0.307 0.000 0.852
Out-of-labour force during last year 0.166 0.209 0.163 0.000 0.428
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment benefit            
receipt (proxy for out-of-the labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004           
Up to one year 0.222 0.240 0.220 0.000 0.652
13 to 18 months 0.039 0.046 0.040 0.000 0.591
19 to 30 months 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.719 0.974
31 to 48 months 0.064 0.062 0.064 0.305 0.910
43 to 60 months 0.066 0.087 0.063 0.000 0.234
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Table 5 continued: Match quality for covariates - women East Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 6 months 0.134 0.110 0.132 0.000 0.682
7 to 9 months 0.042 0.036 0.043 0.000 0.697
10 to 12 months 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.352 0.881
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 3 months 0.109 0.106 0.111 0.187 0.567
4 to 6 months 0.170 0.155 0.170 0.000 0.972
7 to 12 months 0.283 0.242 0.283 0.000 0.998
13 to 18 months 0.092 0.066 0.093 0.000 0.708
> 18 months 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.991 0.642
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 6 months 0.165 0.119 0.168 0.000 0.398
7 to 9 months 0.091 0.075 0.090 0.000 0.680
10 to 12 months 0.551 0.557 0.552 0.188 0.869
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.079 0.064 0.080 0.000 0.675
7 to 12 months 0.080 0.069 0.079 0.000 0.498
13 to 30 months 0.276 0.242 0.278 0.000 0.708
31 to 60 months 0.286 0.326 0.288 0.000 0.711
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.783 0.726 0.785 0.000 0.765
Cumulated dur. of regular employment, 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.144 0.121 0.143 0.000 0.775
7 to 12 months 0.082 0.075 0.081 0.001 0.717
13 to 18 months 0.079 0.078 0.081 0.583 0.470
19 to 42 months 0.087 0.100 0.087 0.000 0.957
43 to 60 months 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.000 0.556
Interaction terms with age below 25 years           
under 25, no voc. training 0.067 0.039 0.065 0.000 0.334
under 25, regular employment 0.063 0.023 0.061 0.000 0.422
under 25, out-of-labour force for one year or less 0.036 0.014 0.035 0.000 0.737
under 25, out-of-labour force for more than one year 0.122 0.055 0.117 0.000 0.199
ALMP participation in last five years (yes)           
Job creation schemes 0.356 0.233 0.361 0.000 0.291
Private employment subsidy 0.071 0.075 0.070 0.088 0.728
Further vocational training 0.256 0.203 0.258 0.000 0.718
Retraining 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.060 0.978
Short-term training (classroom) 0.389 0.334 0.389 0.000 0.960
Short-term training (practical) 0.085 0.066 0.084 0.000 0.724
Startup subsidy 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.000 0.736
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement 0.032 0.027 0.032 0.000 0.977
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement 0.058 0.039 0.058 0.000 0.871
Other ALMP 0.090 0.055 0.091 0.000 0.732
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Table 5 continued: Match quality for covariates - women East Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Time since end of last ALMP           
13 to 24 months 0.157 0.121 0.159 0.000 0.707
> 24 months 0.172 0.146 0.173 0.000 0.850
ALMP during last year 0.396 0.272 0.401 0.000 0.406
Number of ALMP participations in the last five years           
One 0.265 0.277 0.269 0.002 0.376
Two or three 0.415 0.319 0.415 0.000 0.866
Four and more 0.129 0.084 0.130 0.000 0.956
Industry of last contributory job           
Job with missing sector, agric./forestry/fishing, mining/energy/water 
supply, food, tobacco industry 
0.186 0.243 0.185 0.000 0.726
Wood, paper, publishing, printing 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.906 0.919
Chemical industry, engineering, vehical industry 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.067 0.806
Construction 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.029 0.596
Wholesale trade and car sales 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.461 0.651
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants 0.077 0.109 0.077 0.000 0.890
Transport and communication 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.039 0.654
Services for companies 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.484 0.730
Public adminstration, defense, social security agencies 0.102 0.065 0.104 0.000 0.505
Education 0.077 0.057 0.078 0.000 0.906
Health care, veterinarian and social services 0.095 0.068 0.096 0.000 0.925
Other services 0.140 0.110 0.140 0.000 0.976
Last professional status           
Skilled worker / foreman, White-collar worker 0.313 0.323 0.315 0.016 0.733
Part-time 0.334 0.294 0.333 0.000 0.948
No job yet 0.152 0.172 0.150 0.000 0.498
Size of last establishment           
21 to 50 employees 0.116 0.100 0.117 0.000 0.750
> 50 employees or missing 0.537 0.512 0.538 0.000 0.845
Last monthly real wage (defined with CPI, 2000=100)           
>0 to 500 Euro 0.050 0.056 0.049 0.001 0.906
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.343 0.322 0.344 0.000 0.863
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.350 0.311 0.351 0.000 0.754
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.053 0.061 0.053 0.000 0.899
> 2000 Euro 0.020 0.029 0.020 0.000 0.960
Time since end of last contributory job           
7 to 24 months 0.250 0.192 0.251 0.000 0.938
> 24 months 0.487 0.549 0.487 0.000 0.977
7 to 12 months 0.252 0.197 0.255 0.000 0.501
13 to 18 months 0.153 0.132 0.154 0.000 0.814
19 to 60 months 0.072 0.081 0.072 0.000 0.734
Number of jobs in last five years           
One 0.439 0.399 0.440 0.000 0.801
Two 0.192 0.152 0.195 0.000 0.502
Three or more 0.046 0.037 0.046 0.000 0.996
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 0.080 0.148 0.080 0.000 1.000
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Table 5 continued: Match quality for covariates - women East Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Partner was unemployed between 01/2000 to 12/2004 for           
1 to 12 months 0.076 0.083 0.078 0.004 0.549
13 to 30 months 0.112 0.112 0.113 0.972 0.923
31 to 42 months 0.071 0.078 0.073 0.005 0.635
43 to 60 months 0.083 0.108 0.084 0.000 0.663
Partner not empl. or job-seeker in the last 5 years for           
1 to 12 months 0.120 0.133 0.120 0.000 0.784
13 to 12 months 0.026 0.030 0.026 0.003 0.842
25 to 30 months 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.783 0.924
31 to 60 months 0.097 0.123 0.099 0.000 0.407
Regional variables (district level)           
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 22.851 23.041 22.834 0.000 0.662
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 8.121 8.271 8.097 0.000 0.610
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 39.885 40.143 39.875 0.000 0.837
%age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -2.970 -2.655 -2.929 0.000 0.500
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.456 0.901
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -9.823 -10.507 -9.564 0.060 0.574
Urban areas with average labour amrket cond. 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.000 0.897
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.120 0.085 0.119 0.000 0.712
Rural areas in East Germany with severe LM conditions 0.360 0.312 0.364 0.000 0.417
Rural areas in East Germany with very severe LM conditions 0.172 0.179 0.172 0.034 0.985
Other           
Looking for part-time job 0.046 0.070 0.046 0.000 0.992
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Table 6:  Match quality for covariates - men West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        
on difference be-
tween  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Age in years           
21-24 0.160 0.052 0.159 0.000 0.943
25-45 0.537 0.580 0.542 0.000 0.354
46-50 0.123 0.139 0.124 0.000 0.972
51-57 0.114 0.180 0.112 0.000 0.476
58-62 0.007 0.026 0.007 0.000 0.991
Health           
Impairment of health 0.141 0.175 0.141 0.000 0.984
Disability 0.039 0.051 0.040 0.000 0.833
Nationality           
German with migration background 0.061 0.058 0.061 0.096 0.997
Turkish 0.042 0.083 0.042 0.000 0.961
Soviet Union 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.004 0.931
Other foreigners 0.068 0.119 0.068 0.000 0.855
Partner and children           
No partner 0.655 0.591 0.656 0.000 0.759
Partner, not married 0.076 0.066 0.076 0.000 0.950
One child 0.093 0.111 0.093 0.000 0.920
Two children 0.072 0.090 0.073 0.000 0.603
Three and more children 0.050 0.063 0.050 0.000 0.982
Vocational training           
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.306 0.273 0.309 0.000 0.485
Secondary school, vocational education or GCSE 0.413 0.411 0.414 0.606 0.745
A-levels, no vocational training 0.013 0.021 0.013 0.000 0.831
A-levels, vocational training 0.027 0.035 0.027 0.000 0.952
A-levels, college 0.017 0.030 0.018 0.000 0.571
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005           
7 to 12 months 0.799 0.811 0.802 0.000 0.501
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 30 months 0.667 0.581 0.666 0.000 0.962
31 to 48 months 0.270 0.337 0.272 0.000 0.643
Out-of-labour force during last year 0.295 0.281 0.294 0.000 0.886
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment benefit            
receipt (proxy for out-of-the labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.319 0.335 0.319 0.000 0.975
7 to 30 months 0.261 0.237 0.261 0.000 0.850
31 to 36 months 0.040 0.029 0.041 0.000 0.633
37 to 48 months 0.119 0.113 0.117 0.023 0.513
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 9 months 0.226 0.200 0.224 0.000 0.610
10 to 12 months 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.682 0.901
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 3 months 0.088 0.070 0.088 0.000 0.799
4 to 6 months 0.111 0.090 0.110 0.000 0.607
7 to 9 months 0.110 0.100 0.110 0.000 0.864
10 to 12 months 0.457 0.511 0.459 0.000 0.681
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Table 6 continued: Match quality for covariates - men West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        
on difference bet-
ween  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.128 0.115 0.127 0.000 0.699
7 to 24 months 0.271 0.246 0.272 0.000 0.928
25 to 42 months 0.151 0.166 0.152 0.000 0.740
43 to 48 months 0.069 0.117 0.069 0.000 0.902
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.728 0.740 0.730 0.000 0.753
Cumulated dur. of regular employment, 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.170 0.132 0.173 0.000 0.448
7 to 18 months 0.258 0.228 0.258 0.000 0.984
19 to 42 months 0.231 0.253 0.230 0.000 0.867
43 to 60 months 0.019 0.030 0.019 0.000 0.776
Interaction terms with age below 25 years           
under 25, regular employment 0.126 0.039 0.125 0.000 0.885
age*noieb (<=24 months) 0.115 0.034 0.115 0.000 0.910
age*noieb (>24 months) 0.093 0.038 0.091 0.000 0.472
ALMP participation in last five years (yes)           
Job creation schemes 0.133 0.059 0.132 0.000 0.798
Private employment subsidy 0.071 0.068 0.071 0.143 0.814
Further vocational training 0.190 0.149 0.190 0.000 0.858
Short-term training (classroom) 0.388 0.303 0.390 0.000 0.683
Short-term training (practical) 0.126 0.084 0.127 0.000 0.678
Other short-term training 0.046 0.016 0.045 0.000 0.526
Startup subsidy 0.021 0.034 0.022 0.000 0.792
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement 0.065 0.054 0.065 0.000 0.984
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement 0.053 0.040 0.052 0.000 0.793
Other ALMP 0.104 0.052 0.102 0.000 0.644
Time since end of last ALMP           
13 to 24 months 0.159 0.113 0.159 0.000 0.904
> 24 months 0.151 0.122 0.151 0.000 0.954
ALMP during last year 0.401 0.275 0.398 0.000 0.667
Number of ALMP participations in the last five years           
One 0.282 0.278 0.284 0.315 0.551
Two 0.204 0.168 0.203 0.000 0.782
Three or four 0.196 0.127 0.195 0.000 0.879
Five and more 0.063 0.032 0.064 0.000 0.575
Industry of last contributory job           
Job with missing sector 0.081 0.144 0.081 0.000 0.923
Agriculture/forestry/fishing, mining/energy/water supply 0.028 0.019 0.029 0.000 0.662
Food and tobacco, wood, paper, publishing, printing, chemical indus-
try, engineering, vehical industry construction 0.134 0.157 0.133 0.000 0.722
Wholesale trade and car sales, public adminstration, defense, social 
security agencies, education 0.132 0.175 0.133 0.000 0.847
Services for companies 0.193 0.161 0.195 0.000 0.565
Public adminstration, defense, social security agencies 0.066 0.029 0.064 0.000 0.378
Education 0.040 0.023 0.041 0.000 0.562
Health care, veterinarian and social services 0.060 0.034 0.061 0.000 0.658
Other services 0.061 0.053 0.061 0.000 0.964
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Table 6 continued: Match quality for covariates - men West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        
on difference bet-
ween  
  Averages treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Last professional status           
Skilled worker / foreman 0.139 0.179 0.140 0.000 0.848
White-collar worker 0.080 0.114 0.081 0.000 0.788
Part-time 0.080 0.069 0.080 0.000 0.971
No job yet 0.139 0.130 0.137 0.000 0.411
Size of last establishment           
21 to 50 employees 0.147 0.135 0.148 0.000 0.849
51 to 100 employees 0.137 0.113 0.138 0.000 0.640
> 100 employees 0.296 0.282 0.296 0.000 0.814
Missing 0.030 0.039 0.028 0.000 0.344
Last monthly real wage (defined with CPI, 2000=100)           
>0 to 500 Euro 0.056 0.046 0.057 0.000 0.836
>500 to 1500 Euro 0.452 0.350 0.454 0.000 0.648
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.196 0.226 0.197 0.000 0.840
> 2000 Euro 0.126 0.196 0.126 0.000 0.923
Time since end of last contributory job           
7 to 36 months 0.442 0.393 0.444 0.000 0.728
37 to 48 months 0.109 0.118 0.111 0.000 0.475
> 48 months 0.177 0.264 0.179 0.000 0.580
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 12/2004           
7 to 12 months 0.242 0.204 0.242 0.000 0.964
13 to 36 months 0.194 0.217 0.195 0.000 0.873
37 to 60 months 0.018 0.025 0.018 0.000 0.982
Number of jobs in last five years           
One or more 0.748 0.683 0.749 0.000 0.620
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 0.053 0.102 0.052 0.000 0.510
Partner not empl. or job-seeker in the last 5 years for           
1 to 12 months 0.046 0.061 0.045 0.000 0.541
13 to 12 months 0.028 0.033 0.028 0.001 0.772
25 to 60 months 0.238 0.269 0.238 0.000 0.960
Partner education           
Secondary school, with and without vocational education or GCSE 
or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.121 0.127 0.120 0.017 0.746
Missing: no partner IEB identifier 0.044 0.061 0.043 0.000 0.781
Missing partner education for other reasons 0.098 0.120 0.097 0.000 0.833
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Table 6 continued: Match quality for covariates - men West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        
on difference bet-
ween  
  Averages treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Regional variables (district level)           
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 12.570 13.121 12.575 0.000 0.884
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 14.367 14.907 14.318 0.000 0.665
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 32.099 33.759 32.128 0.000 0.759
%age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 0.360 -0.050 0.413 0.000 0.570
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.002 0.757
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -7.857 -7.860 -7.834 0.991 0.980
Cities in West Germany with average labour market conditions 0.155 0.179 0.155 0.000 0.827
Cities in West Germany with above-average labour market condi-
tions 0.054 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.803
Urban areas with average labour market cond. 0.140 0.173 0.137 0.000 0.366
Rural areas in West Germany with average LM conditions 0.214 0.187 0.215 0.000 0.781
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.360 0.975
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM conditions and high 
seasonal dynamics 0.102 0.042 0.101 0.000 0.821
Rural areas in W. G., favourite LM cond., seasonal dynamics 0.177 0.129 0.178 0.000 0.699
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Table 7:  Match quality for covariates - women West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Age in years           
21-24 0.154 0.060 0.148 0.000 0.276
25-35 0.226 0.263 0.227 0.000 0.884
36-40 0.151 0.158 0.155 0.060 0.422
41-45 0.169 0.155 0.170 0.000 0.868
46-50 0.118 0.128 0.121 0.005 0.581
51-57 0.107 0.170 0.107 0.000 0.962
58-62 0.007 0.032 0.005 0.000 0.338
Health           
Impairment of health 0.101 0.111 0.102 0.003 0.718
Disability 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.100 0.960
Nationality           
German with migration background 0.058 0.060 0.059 0.530 0.706
Turkish 0.030 0.072 0.028 0.000 0.440
Other foreigners 0.080 0.152 0.080 0.000 0.927
No partner 0.759 0.614 0.758 0.000 0.868
Partner and children           
Partner, not married 0.082 0.068 0.082 0.000 0.945
One child 0.213 0.208 0.216 0.313 0.581
Two children 0.109 0.127 0.111 0.000 0.568
Three and more children 0.044 0.062 0.046 0.000 0.377
Vocational training           
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.289 0.276 0.289 0.006 0.923
Secondary school, vocational education 0.244 0.192 0.245 0.000 0.823
GCSE, A-levels 0.290 0.243 0.293 0.000 0.687
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005           
7 to 12 months 0.723 0.594 0.728 0.000 0.462
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.164 0.135 0.163 0.000 0.820
7 to 18 months 0.292 0.221 0.293 0.000 0.821
19 to 30 months 0.196 0.155 0.196 0.000 0.968
31 to 36 months 0.065 0.059 0.067 0.028 0.703
37 to 48 months 0.130 0.149 0.131 0.000 0.839
Out-of-labour force during last year 0.341 0.441 0.339 0.000 0.752
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment benefit            
receipt (proxy for out-of-the labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.235 0.205 0.232 0.000 0.675
7 to 12 months 0.087 0.080 0.087 0.032 0.992
13 to 18 months 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.411 0.726
19 to 30 months 0.115 0.101 0.119 0.000 0.426
more than 30 months 0.266 0.344 0.264 0.000 0.720
Cum. dur. of UI receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.225 0.159 0.226 0.000 0.813
7 to 12 months 0.273 0.203 0.272 0.000 0.886
> 12 months 0.087 0.085 0.087 0.601 0.984
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2004 to 01/2005           
1 to 6 months 0.176 0.111 0.176 0.000 0.930
7 to 9 months 0.088 0.064 0.088 0.000 0.943
10 to 12 months 0.363 0.313 0.365 0.000 0.821
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Table 7 continued: Match quality for covariates - women West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Cum. dur. of UA receipt, 02/2000 to 01/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.117 0.080 0.116 0.000 0.888
7 to 12 months 0.084 0.063 0.083 0.000 0.900
13 to 30 months 0.151 0.125 0.152 0.000 0.916
31 to 36 months 0.032 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.915
37 to 42 months 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.863 0.628
43 to 48 months 0.050 0.066 0.049 0.000 0.800
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.045 0.041 0.045 0.065 0.939
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.601 0.467 0.602 0.000 0.815
Cumulated dur. of regular employment, 01/2000 to 12/2004           
1 to 6 months 0.140 0.101 0.143 0.000 0.523
7 to 18 months 0.244 0.180 0.247 0.000 0.559
19 to 24 months 0.074 0.064 0.072 0.000 0.696
25 to 42 months 0.126 0.119 0.126 0.032 0.965
43 to 60 months 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.000 0.893
Interaction terms with age below 25 years           
under 25, regular employment 0.104 0.033 0.101 0.000 0.520
ALMP participation in last five years (yes)           
Job creation schemes 0.071 0.027 0.070 0.000 0.738
Private employment subsidy 0.045 0.031 0.046 0.000 0.862
Further vocational training 0.172 0.103 0.169 0.000 0.651
Short-term training (classroom) 0.348 0.229 0.350 0.000 0.817
Short-term training (practical) 0.092 0.043 0.091 0.000 0.876
Other short-term training 0.036 0.011 0.034 0.000 0.547
Startup subsidy 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.028 0.801
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement 0.060 0.042 0.058 0.000 0.739
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement 0.049 0.029 0.048 0.000 0.720
Other ALMP 0.097 0.058 0.097 0.000 0.898
Time since end of last ALMP           
13 to 24 months 0.147 0.087 0.148 0.000 0.854
> 24 months 0.129 0.090 0.131 0.000 0.759
ALMP during last year 0.365 0.208 0.363 0.000 0.856
Number of ALMP participations in the last five years           
One 0.275 0.229 0.278 0.000 0.619
Two or three 0.277 0.171 0.277 0.000 0.951
Four  0.051 0.024 0.051 0.000 0.906
Five and more 0.046 0.017 0.044 0.000 0.584
Industry of last contributory job           
Job with missing sector, agriculture/forestry/fishing, min-
ing/energy/water supply, food and tobacco, wood, paper, publishing, 
printing, chemical industry, engineering, vehical industry 0.132 0.173 0.134 0.000 0.659
Construction 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.190 0.775
Wholesale trade and car sales 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.324 0.786
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants, transport and communication 0.131 0.133 0.131 0.499 0.976
Services for companies 0.144 0.123 0.149 0.000 0.342
Public adminstration, defense, social security agencies, education, 
health care, verterinarian and social services 0.209 0.117 0.210 0.000 0.803
Other services 0.073 0.056 0.073 0.000 0.836
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Table 7 continued: Match quality for covariates - women West Germany 
    P-value of t-test 
        on difference between  
    Averages   treated and controls 
Control variables Matched All  Matched before after 
  treated controls controls matching 
Last professional status           
Skilled worker / foreman 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.134 0.867
White-collar worker 0.205 0.180 0.207 0.000 0.672
Part-time 0.225 0.213 0.225 0.013 0.884
No job yet 0.235 0.323 0.228 0.000 0.236
Size of last establishment           
21 to 50 employees 0.119 0.098 0.120 0.000 0.778
51 to 100 employees 0.122 0.091 0.122 0.000 0.947
> 100 employees 0.286 0.250 0.289 0.000 0.679
Missing 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.409 0.748
Last monthly real wage (defined with CPI, 2000=100)           
> 0 to 2000 Euro 0.655 0.538 0.661 0.000 0.381
> 2000 Euro 0.056 0.061 0.055 0.037 0.755
Time since end of last contributory job           
7 to 36 months 0.402 0.299 0.405 0.000 0.613
>36 months 0.257 0.300 0.260 0.000 0.683
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 12/2004           
7 to 24 months 0.376 0.289 0.377 0.000 0.919
25 to 60 months 0.048 0.062 0.049 0.000 0.654
Number of jobs in last five years           
One or two 0.563 0.455 0.571 0.000 0.301
Three or more 0.085 0.061 0.084 0.000 0.734
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 0.082 0.147 0.082 0.000 0.895
Partner education           
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.065 0.096 0.066 0.000 0.742
Secondary school, vocational education 0.053 0.067 0.053 0.000 0.897
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.022 0.034 0.022 0.000 0.929
Missing partner education 0.055 0.108 0.057 0.000 0.622
Regional variables (district level)           
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 12.750 13.211 12.746 0.000 0.960
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 14.903 16.564 14.729 0.000 0.318
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 32.122 32.796 32.160 0.000 0.756
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -8.278 -9.623 -8.300 0.000 0.955
Cities in West Germany with average labour market conditions 0.174 0.186 0.172 0.006 0.695
Cities in West Germany with above-average labour market conditions 0.061 0.051 0.061 0.000 0.908
Urban areas with average labour amrket cond. 0.140 0.173 0.138 0.000 0.617
Rural areas in West Germany with average LM conditions 0.198 0.166 0.199 0.000 0.948
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.039 0.034 0.038 0.013 0.614
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM conditions and high sea-
sonal dynamics 
0.089 0.052 0.089 0.000 0.992
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond., seasonal dynamics and 
low LTU 
0.058 0.049 0.059 0.000 0.951
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond. and low LTU 0.113 0.091 0.116 0.000 0.525
Other           
Looking for part-time job 0.177 0.230 0.181 0.000 0.464
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Table 8:  Outcomes for all controls, treatments and matched controls  
20 months after programme start (in percentage points) 
          
Outcome       
    All controls Treated 
Matched 
controls 
Employment rate       
  Men, East Germany 15.9 16.1 16.4 
  Women, East Germany 11.3 13.4 12.4 
  Men, West Germany 16.8 20.7 20.1 
  Women, West Germany 12.9 19.5 16.9 
          
Neither unemployed nor job-seeking rate       
  Men, East Germany 24.3 20.4 23.9 
  Women, East Germany 21.9 18.2 22.0 
  Men, West Germany 31.3 28.8 32.5 
  Women, West Germany 32.4 29.2 32.7 
          
No UB II receipt rate       
  Men, East Germany 17.7 16.1 18.7 
  Women, East Germany 15.9 14.4 17.1 
  Men, West Germany 24.0 23.7 26.8 
  Women, West Germany 22.1 22.4 24.8 
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Table 9:  ATTs – regular employment rate1) (in percentage points) 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
    12th month 20th month 12th month 20th month 12th month 20th month 12th month 20th month 
                      
Total sample -1.1 *** -0.3   -0.4   1.0 *** -0.6 * 0.6   -0.4   2.7 *** 
Age                                   
  15-24 -2.4 *** -0.4   -2.4 ** -0.6   -2.1 ** -1.5   -2.7 ** 0.9   
  25-35 -2.1 *** -1.1   -1.0   1.5   -0.7   1.0   -0.3   4.3 *** 
  36-50 -0.5   -0.9 * -0.3   1.1 ** -0.2   1.4 *** 0.4   3.0 *** 
  51-62 -0.3   0.3   0.4   1.5 ** -0.4   1.5 * -0.1   2.2 * 
Nationality                                 
  German -1.1 *** -0.3   -0.7 *** 0.8 ** -0.9 *** 0.7 * -0.3   2.2 *** 
  German, migrants -2.9 * -1.6   0.4   0.6   -1.2   -1.2   2.2   6.8 *** 
  Foreigners -1.2   -0.8   -2.4 * -0.7    -    -   -   -   
  former USSR  -   -   -   -   1.2   0.3   -5.1 *** -2.6   
  Turkish2)  -   -   -   -   1.0   1.2   -4.0 * 1.0   
  other foreigners  -   -   -   -   -1.2   2.1   -1.1   2.9   
Qualification                                  
  no qualification -1.1 ** 0.3   -1.1 ** 0.2   -0.9 ** 0.3   -0.2   2.5 *** 
  apprenticeship -1.4 *** -0.9 * -0.5   0.9 * -0.7   1.7 ** -0.7   2.6 ** 
  höherer Abschluss -1.8   0.9   1.2   3.0 * -4.6 *** -0.9   0.7   4.3 ** 
Unemployment rate3)                                 
  low -1.0 ** -0.9   -0.4   0.0   -0.5   0.8   0.2   3.0 *** 
  intermediate1 -1.0 ** -0.3   -0.3   1.4 ** -0.7   0.3   0.8   2.0 * 
  intermediate2 -0.6   -0.8   -1.1 ** 0.8   -1.7 *** 0.2   -0.9   1.9 * 
  high -1.6 *** -0.8   -0.1   1.2 ** -0.7   1.5 ** -0.1   3.7 *** 
Last regular job in                                 
  2004 -2.7 *** -3.1 ** -2.8 ** -2.3   -3.6 *** -3.0 ** -6.2 *** -1.5   
  2001-2003 -1.4 ** -0.6   0.0   1.3   -0.4   1.8 *** 0.9   2.7 *** 
  1992-2000 -0.2   0.8 * 0.2   2.1 *** 0.3   1.7 *** 2.7 *** 5.8 *** 
  <1992 or never -1.3   1.2   -0.6   0.9   0.4   0.7   0.3   3.2 *** 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (5 neighbours) 
2) Only persons aged younger than 58 years. 
3) Unemployment rate in January 2005 (district level); low East G. “<=21%“, low West G. “<=10.5%“, intermediate1 East G. “21-22%“, 
intermediate1 West G. “10.5-12%“, intermediate2 East G. “22-23.5%“, intermediate2 West G. “12-14.5%“, high East G. “>23.5%“, high 
West G. “>14.5%“. 
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Table 10:  ATTs – neither unemployed nor job-seeking (in percentage points) 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
    12th month 25th month 12th month 25th month 12th month 25th month 12th month 25th month 
                                    
Total sample -3.6 *** -4.0 *** -4.4 *** -3.2 *** -4.2 *** -3.3 *** -5.4 *** -4.5 *** 
Age                                   
  15-24 -4.7 *** -2.1 * -10.0 *** -2.3   -7.3 *** -3.4 *** -11.0 *** -5.4 *** 
  25-35 -1.8 ** -2.7 *** -5.4 *** -1.4   -2.7 *** -1.6 * -3.9 *** -3.2 ** 
  36-50 -2.5 *** -4.1 *** -1.8 *** -2.5 *** -2.2 *** -2.7 *** -2.8 *** -3.8 *** 
  51-62 -6.7 *** -9.8 *** -5.4 *** -8.7 *** -6.3 *** -8.0 *** -4.7 *** -7.1 *** 
Nationality                                 
  German -3.7 *** -4.7 *** -4.1 *** -2.7 *** -4.2 *** -2.9 *** -5.5 *** -5.9 *** 
  German, migrants -4.2 * -7.2 ** -5.8 ** -7.3 ** -4.2 *** -3.2 * -3.2   1.7   
  Foreigner -3.4   -2.9 *** -9.7 *** -10.1 ***  -    -   -   -  
  former USSR  -    -   -   -  -4.1 * -6.5 ** -6.7 ** -6.4 * 
  Turkish  -    -   -   -  -4.4 *** -3.6 * -11.9 *** -5.6   
  Turkish2)  -    -   -   -  -4.7 *** -5.1 *** -3.5   -3.8   
Qualification                                  
  no qualification -3.6 *** -3.6 *** -5.8 *** -3.7 *** -5.2 *** -3.8 *** -6.3 *** -6.5 *** 
  apprenticeship -4.1 *** -5.2 *** -4.3 *** -3.7 *** -4.1 *** -3.1 *** -5.3 *** -3.8 *** 
  higher  -8.3 *** -7.6 *** -2.3   -4.3 ** -6.8 *** -6.0 ** -4.7 * -5.9 ** 
Unemployment rate1)                                 
  low -3.9 *** -3.8 *** -4.7 *** -3.1 *** -4.2 *** -3.5 *** -4.0 *** -3.3 *** 
  intermediate1 -5.0 *** -5.5 *** -5.2 *** -4.1 *** -4.5 *** -4.3 *** -6.3 *** -5.5 *** 
  intermediate2 -3.5 *** -6.0 *** -4.8 *** -4.8 *** -5.1 *** -3.7 *** -7.4 *** -6.2 *** 
  high -3.3 *** -4.2 *** -3.3 *** -2.1 *** -4.7 *** -3.2 *** -4.6 *** -5.5 *** 
Last regular job in                                 
  2004 -4.4 *** -4.6 *** -4.5 *** -1.6   -5.8 *** -5.3 *** -7.2 *** -5.1 *** 
  2001-2003 -2.4 *** -4.1 *** -4.2 *** -3.8 *** -3.0 *** -1.8 *** -4.0 *** -3.9 *** 
  1992-2000 -3.2 *** -4.9 *** -3.2 *** -3.4 *** -3.4 *** -4.2 *** -2.6 ** -5.5 *** 
  <1992 or never -7.5 *** -4.6 *** -7.8 *** -3.9 *** -7.3 *** -5.2 *** -8.9 *** -5.9 *** 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (5 neighbours) 
2) Only persons aged younger than 58 years. 
3) Unemployment rate in January 2005 (district level); low East G. “<=21%“, low West G. “<=10.5%“, intermediate1 East G. “21-22%“, 
intermediate1 West G. “10.5-12%“, intermediate2 East G. “22-23.5%“, intermediate2 West G. “12-14.5%“, high East G. “>23.5%“, high 
West G. “>14.5%“.
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Table 11:  ATTs – no UB II receipt (in percentage points) 
    East Germany West Germany 
    Men Women Men Women 
    12th month 24th month 12th month 24th month 12th month 24th month 12th month 24th month 
                                    
Total sample -2.8 *** -2.8 *** -3.1 *** -2.6 *** -4.1 *** -3.0 *** -3.4 *** -2.3 *** 
Age                                   
  15-24 -3.1 *** -3.0 *** -3.3 *** -2.8 ** -6.8 *** -4.0 *** -4.2 *** -2.0   
  25-35 -2.9 *** -3.8 *** -2.9 *** -1.4   -4.6 *** -3.3 *** -2.5 ** -2.2 * 
  36-50 -2.7 *** -3.1 *** -3.2 *** -2.9 *** -2.7 *** -2.6 *** -3.9 *** -3.9 *** 
  51-62 -2.9 *** -3.3 *** -4.4 *** -3.8 *** -3.4 *** -0.8   -0.9   0.6   
Nationality                                
  German -3.0 *** -3.1 *** -3.2 *** -2.7 *** -4.0 *** -3.1 *** -3.6 *** -3.3 *** 
  German, migrants -2.0   -4.2 * -4.2 ** -6.5 *** -3.3 *** -0.7   0.1   2.6   
  Foreigner -1.3   -2.9   -4.9 *** -4.3 *  -   -   -   -   
  former USSR  -   -   -   -   -3.1 * -1.0   -2.3   5.0   
  Turkish2)  -   -   -   -   -4.7 *** -4.0 ** -5.9 ** -4.6   
  other foreigners  -   -   -   -   -6.1 *** -4.5 *** -4.1 ** 0.7   
Qualification                                 
  no qualification -2.2 *** -2.1 *** -2.5 *** -3.0 *** -4.6 *** -3.8 *** -3.3 *** -3.1 *** 
  apprenticeship -3.2 *** -3.4 *** -3.8 *** -3.5 *** -4.0 *** -1.9 *** -3.4 *** -2.1 ** 
  higher  -5.8 *** -5.8 *** -3.9 ** -3.4   -5.1 ** -3.5   -4.0 * -2.8   
Unemployment rate3)                                
  low -2.9 *** -3.0 *** -4.2 *** -3.9 *** -4.7 *** -3.7 *** -2.3 ** -0.9   
  intermediate1 -3.5 *** -4.4 *** -3.7 *** -3.7 *** -3.4 *** -4.1 *** -3.2 *** -2.9 ** 
  intermediate2 -2.4 *** -4.0 *** -3.1 *** -3.0 *** -4.8 *** -3.1 *** -3.3 *** -2.9 ** 
  high -2.7 *** -2.2 *** -2.5 *** -1.3 * -4.1 *** -1.2 * -2.6 *** -1.1   
Last regular job in                                
  2004 -3.5 *** -3.5 *** -4.3 *** -4.1 ** -5.9 *** -5.1 *** -5.4 *** -4.8 *** 
  2001-2003 -2.5 *** -2.7 *** -2.6 *** -3.6 *** -3.3 *** -2.2 *** -2.4 *** -1.9 ** 
  1992-2000 -2.3 *** -2.4 *** -3.4 *** -2.8 *** -2.8 *** -3.0 *** -1.7 * -1.3   
  <1992 or never -3.9 *** -3.6 *** -2.8 *** -2.4 ** -7.1 *** -4.7 *** -4.2 *** -2.9 ** 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (5 neighbours) 
2) Only persons aged younger than 58 years. 
3) Unemployment rate in January 2005 (district level); low East G. “<=21%“, low West G. “<=10.5%“, intermediate1 East G. “21-22%“, 
intermediate1 West G. “10.5-12%“, intermediate2 East G. “22-23.5%“, intermediate2 West G. “12-14.5%“, high East G. “>23.5%“, high 
West G. “>14.5%“. 
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Figure 1:  Distribution of the propensity score – East Germany 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of the propensity score – West Germany 
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Figure 3:  ATT of One-Euro-Jobs (in percentage points) 
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